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Abstract of Thesis Entitled: 
Value strategy identifies stocks that appear to be undervalued by the market and 
invests in them. Previous studies found that value stocks generated higher returns than 
glamour stocks in Hong Kong stock market and the superior return of value stocks could 
not be explained by higher degree of risks. This thesis proposes that the superior return 
of value stocks was a result of investor expectation errors. In this study, value stocks 
were identified as those that had low P/E ratios or high book-to-market equity ratios. 
The database encompasses all common stocks in the HKSE from 1986 to 1997. 
Since investors' expectation could not be directly measured, earnings 
announcement returns for glamour and value stocks were computed to reflect investors' 
reaction to company earnings announcements. The evidence indicated that investors 
systematically underestimated the future prospect of value stocks and overestimated that 
of glamour stocks. When they realized their errors and adjusted their portfolio holdings, 
their trading actions led to increases in the price of value stocks and decreases in the 
price of glamour stocks, and hence the return of value stocks was higher than that of 
glamour stocks. Similar findings have been obtained in the US. The major difference is 
the window during which earnings announcement returns are measured. We found that, 
in the case of Hong Kong, difference in announcement returns between glamour and 
value portfolios was most significant for windows of nine to eleven trading days, as 
opposed to three days in the US. Furthermore, contrary to the US experience, value 
stocks were not stocks of previously slow-growth companies and glamour stocks that of 
i 
previously fast-growth companies overall. Earlier hypotheses that investors extrapolated 
from the past growth performance of companies, which in turn gave rise to expectation 
errors, are not supported by the Hong Kong data. 
Submitted by Wong Man Kit 
for the degree of Master of Philosophy in Economics 
at The Chinese University of Hong Kong in June 2002 
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An investor may make superior returns by buying under-priced value stocks that 
have high earnings to price (E/P) or high book to market equity (B/M) ratios relative to 
buying glamour stocks that have low E/P or B/M ratios. This strategy is known as value 
strategy. Semi-strong form efficient market hypothesis (SEMH) asserts that current 
prices fully reflect the history of stock prices and all public information such as annual 
reports and company announcements. Since fundamental ratios are available to the 
public, no excess returns can be earned by contrarian investors if SEMH holds. 
However, past researches showed that value stocks outperformed glamour stocks by 
generating higher returns in international stock markets (Fama and French (1998)). 
Some scholars argued that these excess returns arose from higher risks inherited by 
value stocks instead of inefficient stock market. On the other hand, scholars like 
Laknishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) carried out comprehensive studies on this issue 
and found that the difference in risks between value and glamour stocks could not fully 
explain the higher average returns generated by value stocks. 
Several studies had investigated the performance of value strategy in Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange and found that value stocks in Hong Kong also generated higher returns 
than glamour stocks. Since value strategy tended to long high B/M ratio, high E/P ratio 
and small-sized stocks, some people argued that value stocks might be dominated by 
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small-size firms with higher risks leading to higher returns. Wong (1999) found that 
after controlling for the size effect, value stocks still continued to generate higher returns 
than glamour stocks. Wong (1999) and Mak (1996) further investigated whether value 
stocks were fundamentally riskier and so extra returns were required to compensate for 
higher risks by examining various measures of risk, including standard deviations, 
coefficients of variation, CAPM betas, performance of portfolios in bad states of the 
economy and stock market. In addition, Wong (1999) applied Fama & French's three-
factor model (1993) to investigate whether the behavior of returns on portfolios could be 
explained by risk factors related to size and B/M ratio. The above results indicated that 
value stocks were not systematically riskier and value premiums continued to exist in 
value stocks classified by B/M or E/P ratios even after taking risk factors related to size 
and B/M ratio into account. 
Hence, if risk is not the reason that accounts for value stocks' superior return, 
there must be some other explanations that the previous Hong Kong studies have not 
covered yet. Some overseas scholars such as LSV (1994), Dechow and Sloan (1997) 
suggest expectation error hypothesis may account for the excess return of value stocks. 
They believe that investors make errors in anticipation about the future prospect of 
stocks in reality. Sometimes, investors are too optimistic for certain stocks like glamour 
stocks and overestimate the performance of these stocks and hence bid up their stock 
prices. This leads to low E/P or B/M ratios of glamour stocks, which appear to be 
overvalued by the market. On the other hand, investors anticipate some stocks like 
value stock would continue to perform badly in the coming future and so they sell them 
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now or do not invest in them. This leads to lower prices and higher E/P or B/M ratios of 
value stocks. Scholars suggest two possible sources of expectation error made by 
investors: The first one is related to extrapolating from past performance of firms. The 
second one is analysts' biased long-term earnings growth forecasts. 
As previous studies on value strategy in Hong Kong only concluded that value 
stocks were not riskier than glamour stocks, this thesis aims to test whether expectation 
error hypothesis mentioned above can explain the higher returns generated by value 
stocks in Hong Kong stock market. We will use approach similar to that of Laknishok, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1994) and La Porta, Laknishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1997). Value 
stocks are identified as those that have high E/P or high B/M ratios. Glamour stocks are 
those that have low E/P or low B/M ratios. The database used in this study encompasses 
all common stocks in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE) from 1986 to 1997. 
First, we compute annual buy and hold returns for value and glamour portfolios for 5 
years after portfolio formation. Second, we compare stock price reactions around 
earnings announcement date for value and glamour stocks in Hong Kong. Since 
investors' expectation cannot be directly observed and expectation adjustment tends to 
take place more clearly around the time of corporate earnings announcement, we focus 
on earnings announcement return for value and glamour stocks. Third, we focus on the 
source of expectation error. As there is no complete data on analysts' earnings forecasts, 
we only test LSV naiVe extrapolation model. LSV (1994) argued that investors used 
past performance of firms to extrapolate their future performances and tended to 
overestimate the future growth rate of glamour stocks relative to value stocks. LSV 
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found that extrapolation model could be applied to explain part of excess return of value 
stocks in the U.S. stock markets. Thus, it is interesting to test whether this can also work 
in the HKSE. 
Our result indicated that value stocks generated higher returns than glamour 
stocks in the first 2 to 3 years after portfolio formation. This evidence was consistent 
with previous studies. The greatest return difference occurred in the first year and the 
return differences in the following years became smaller. This might imply investor 
realized that those stocks perceived 'bad' in the past outperformed their expectations 
after one to two years. Similar findings for earnings announcement return have been 
obtained in the U.S. by La Porta, Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997). The major 
difference is the window during which announcement returns are measured. After 
experimenting with different window widths, we found that, in the case of Hong Kong, 
announcement returns difference was most significant for windows of nine to eleven 
trading days, as opposed to three days in the US. This might imply more serious 
information leakage in Hong Kong prior to earnings announcement. The earnings 
announcement returns of 9-day and 11-day windows were positive for value stocks and 
higher than glamour stocks in post formation period overall. This indicated positive 
earnings surprise for value stocks and relative disappointment towards the performance 
of glamour stocks. Thus, the result of 9-day and 11-day event returns supported 
expectation error hypothesis. Furthermore, contrary to the U.S. experience, value stocks 
in Hong Kong were not stocks of previously slow-growth companies and glamour stocks 
were not those of previously fast-growth companies. Earlier hypotheses that investors 
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extrapolated from the past growth performance of companies, which in turn gave rise to 
expectation errors, are not supported by the Hong Kong data. 
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 gives brief introduction 
of literature in the past. Chapter 3 describes the data source and methodology. Chapter 
4 presents and interprets the results on annual earnings, earnings announcement returns 
and past and future earnings growth rates of value and glamour portfolios. Chapter 5 




Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) asserts that stock prices reflect all available 
information. Hence no one can expect to make abnormal returns unless the returns are 
compensated for higher risks bore by the investor. There are three forms of EMH 
depending on the set of information involved. Weak form EMH assumes that current 
stock prices reflect all available stock market information including the history of stock 
prices. This version of hypothesis implies that trend analysis is useless. Semi-strong 
form EMH supposes the information set includes market and non-market information 
available to the public such as annual reports, company announcements and analysts' 
forecasts. As soon as information becomes public, it is immediately incorporated into 
stock price and hence no investors can gain by using this information to make abnormal 
profit. Strong form EMH says the set includes all information: market, non-market and 
private information. Even though private information is known to insiders only, its 
proponents believe that if insiders have better information, they will use it immediately 
and hence stock price adjusts quickly and reflects all available information. 
In this paper, we mainly concentrate on one investment strategy called value 
strategy. Value strategy aims to find stocks undervalued by the market and invest in 
them. Value stocks are usually defined as stocks that have high book value to market 
equity (B/M) ratio, earnings to price (E/P) ratio or other fundamental values to price. 
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Glamour stocks refer to those stocks with low E/P ratio, low B/M ratio, among others. If 
value stocks outperform glamour stocks and the superior return cannot be explained by 
higher risk, then semi-strong form EMH will be violated since investors can use public 
information to make abnormal profit. 
2.1 Performance of Value Strategy in Stock Markets over The 
World 
Basil (1977) studied the relationship between performance of stocks and their 
E/P ratios. The sample included industrial firms traded on New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) lasted 14 years from April 1957 to March 1971. He found that portfolio of 
stocks with high E/P ratios generated higher absolute and risk-adjusted rate of returns 
than portfolio of stocks with low E/P ratios, evidence against semi-strong form EMH. 
He argued that E/P ratio and other public information were not reflected in stock price in 
such a rapid manner assumed by SEMH. Thus E/P ratio contained information to select 
stocks that generated higher returns. 
Moreover, Reginganum (1981) found portfolios based on E/P ratios or firm size 
had average returns systemically different from those predicted by capital asset pricing 
model (CAPM) and the superior returns appeared for at least two years. The sample 
consisted of 566 NYSE and American Stock Exchange (AMEX) stocks with period 
from the fourth quarter of 1975 to the third quarter of 1977. He believed the source of 
misspecification was that one period capital asset pricing model omitted some risk 
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factors instead of market inefficiency. These omitted factors seemed to be related to 
firm size and E/P ratio. The result revealed that E/P effects did not appear after 
controlling returns for the firm size while a strong firm size effect still persisted after 
controlling returns for any E/P effect. This might imply the firm effect largely 
subsumed the E/P effect. Hence, he suggested that omitted factors were more closely 
related to firm size than E/P ratio. 
In addition, Peavy III and Goodman (1983) controlled three potential sources of 
return bias: small firm size, infrequent trading and industry effect in the sample. The 
result revealed that E/P ratio was an important factor on stock returns. High E/P 
portfolios outperformed low E/P portfolios and the industry average both before and 
after adjusting CAPM beta risk. Furthermore, Jaffe Keim and Westerfield (1989) 
studied the relationship between stock returns and firm size and E/P ratios by using 
stocks in the U.S. stock markets. The sample duration lasted 35 years, substantially 
longer than previous studies. The data was free of survivorship bias. The result pointed 
out that there was a positive strong relationship between stock returns and E/P ratios. 
All the above results indicated that high E/P portfolio generated returns on average 
higher than low E/P portfolio and these excess returns could not be explained by 
traditional risk measures. 
Apart from using E/P ratio, scholars began to use other fundamentals to price 
like B/M ratio, cash flow to price (C/F) ratio for selecting stocks. For example, 
Rosenberg, Reid and Lanstein (1984) reported the superior performance of book/price 
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strategy was statistically significant. This strategy was to hold stocks with high B/M 
ratio and sell stocks with low B/M ratio. The sample consisted of 1400 companies in the 
U.S. stock markets: NYSE, AMEX, NASDAQ and other regional exchange covered 
from 1980 to 1984. The return of B/M strategy was higher than the market return. 
Earlier studies mainly used data from the U.S. stock markets and empirical 
research extended to other stock markets over time. Chan, Hamao and Lakonishok 
(1991) examined the relationship between differences in returns on Japanese stocks to 
the four fundamental variables: B/M ratio, C/F ratio, E/P ratio and market size. The 
sample included manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms from Tokyo Stock 
Exchange. The sample period extended from 1971 to 1988. They applied the seemingly 
unrelated regression (SUR) model to test the significance of four fundamental variables 
and expected returns in the stock market. Their study indicated that there was a positive 
strong relationship between these variables and expected returns in the stock market, 
especially for B/M ratio and C/F ratio. 
Besides, Capaul, Rowley and Sharpe (1993) computed the returns of glamour 
and value portfolios sorted by B/M ratio for six countries over the period from January 
1981 to June 1992. Six countries included France, Germany, Switzerland, the United 
Kingdom and the U.S. For the U.S., the data came from the S&P/BARRA Value Stock 
Index and the S&P/BARRA Growth Stock Index. For the other countries, they used 
indexes obtained from the Union Bank of Switzerland's Institutional Investment 
Management Group. They defined a factor called Value-Growth factor to represent 
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difference in returns of stocks with different B/M ratios. Risk adjusted return of value 
stocks was higher than that of growth stocks on average in all countries during the 
sample period. They also found that buying value stocks would be more profitable if 
done globally. The result indicated that 'value-growth factor' was significant in each 
country. 
Furthermore, Fama and French (1998) applied value strategy into thirteen 
countries including the United States, Japan, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, 
Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, Sweden, Australia, Hong Kong and Singapore. The 
U.S. portfolios included all NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stocks. Other twelve 
countries had at least ten stocks with MSCI accounting ratios (B/M, E/P, C/F and 
Dividend Yield) in each December from 1974 to 1994. The U.S. data came from CRSP 
and COMPUSTAT. Data for other markets was mainly come from the electronic 
• version of Morgan Stanley's Capital International Perspectives (MSCI). MSCI data 
were free of survivorship bias. When portfolios were formed on B/M, E/P or C/P ratios, 
value stocks outperformed glamour stocks in twelve of thirteen countries during the 
1975-1995 period. Global portfolios were also formed by consisting stocks among 
thirteen countries. The study revealed that the difference in average returns between 
global portfolios of high and low B/M stocks was 7.68% per year and value premiums 
also appeared when stocks were sorted by other ratios. In addition, value premiums 
existed in emerging markets. As a result, superior returns generated by value stocks in 
the U.S. stock markets are not a specific case. Instead, value stocks tend to have higher 
returns than glamour stocks in stock markets around the world. 
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Although there is consensus that value stocks based on financial ratios generates 
higher returns on average over a long period of time, the reasons for explaining this 
phenomenon are still controversial. Three possible explanations are discussed in the 
following section. Previous studies in Hong Kong also indicated that return of value 
stocks was higher than that of glamour stocks while value stocks were not systemically 
riskier than glamour stocks during the sample period. These studies will be introduced 
in Section 2.3. This paper intends to apply expectation error hypothesis to account for 
this phenomenon in Hong Kong stock market. 
2.2 Possible Explanations for Superior Return of Value 
Stocks 
2.2.1 Sampling Biases 
One possible explanation is sampling biases. As earlier empirical studies mainly 
focused on the U.S. stock markets and used data from COMPUSTAT files such as the 
Primary-Supplementary Tertiary (PST) data. This practice might introduce selection bias 
to the study. The selection bias is arisen for two reasons. The COMPUSTAT database 
only contains companies which are currently available. Hence, companies, which have 
merged, bankruptcy or other reasons leading to disappear are excluded from the 
database. Second, when a new company enters, the database provides its full history and 
hence some data in the files are actually not available at an earlier time. 
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Banz and Breen (1986) investigated this problem by comparing results from the 
COMPUSTAT database with those from a database that were free of sampling biases. 
They found that selection bias and look-ahead bias appeared to create E/P premiums. 
Besides, Kortharj, Shanken and Sloan (1995) suggested that the B/M premiums were a 
result of survivorship bias inflating the high B/M stocks' performance and period-
specific performance of both low and high B/M stocks. 
However, several studies using data free of survivorship bias found evidence to 
support the higher returns of value stocks and be against the above assertion. Davis 
(1994) examined the ability of certain fundamental ratios to account for the cross-section 
of stock returns in the U.S. stock markets from July 1940 to June 1963. He used the data 
from annual Moody's Industrial Manuals, which were free from survivorship bias and 
look-ahead bias. The findings indicated that E/P, B/M and C/P ratios still had 
significant explanatory power on realized returns. For instance, high E/P portfolio 
earned 9.5% per year more on average than the low E/P portfolio. 
Furthermore, Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1995) studied whether sample 
selection bias could account for the superior performance of high B/M stocks (value 
stocks) relative to low B/M stocks (glamour stocks). They found that selection bias on 
COMPUSTAT was not a serious problem. Part of NYSE-AMEX companies in CRSP 
missing from COMPUSTAT was due to presence of foreign or nonprimary issues on 
CRSP such as closed-end funds. Besides, many innocuous reasons explained why a 
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company's return data on CRSP did not match with its accounting data on 
COMPUSTAT. Among missing observations, at most 3.1% could be classified as 
financially distressed case. The average return for domestic primary companies on 
COMPUSTAT was only slightly more than that of corresponding companies on CRSP 
over the 1968-1991 period. In addition, value stocks outperformed glamour stocks in 
the top quintile of NYSE-Amex stocks, which was free of survivorship bias. Other 
studies like Fama and French (1998) also used data free of survivorship bias and found 
value stocks generated higher returns in different countries. Hence, it is most likely that 
sampling bias is not the main explanation. 
2.2.2 Risk Factors 
On the other hand, some scholars like Fama and French maintain that high B/M 
stocks (value stocks) generate higher returns than other stocks because they are 
fundamentally riskier. They believe that assets are priced rationally and hence size and 
B/M ratio are proxies for sensitivity to common risk factors in returns. Fama and French 
(1992) used all nonfinancial firms in the U.S. stock markets over the period from 1963 
to 1990. The result indicated that two measure variables: size and B/M ratio were 
powerful to capture the cross-section of average stock returns associated with market 
size, leverage, B/M and E/P ratios while CAPM p did not help explain the cross section 
of average stock returns. The combination of size and B/M ratio tended to absorb the 
effects of leverage and E/P ratio in average stock returns during the sample period. 
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Fama and French (1993) suggested three-factor model (overall market factor, 
factor related to firm size and B/M ratio) to account for the returns on stocks. Monthly 
returns on stocks were regressed on the return to a market portfolio of stocks, mimicking 
portfolios for size and B/M ratio. Stocks were split into 2 groups based on their firm 
size: Small and Big (S & B). The entire sample of stocks was also divided into 3 book-
to-market equity groups according to their B/M ratios: Low, Medium and High (L, M & 
H). Then, they constructed six portfolios (S/L, S/M, S/H B/L, B/M and B/H) from the 
intersection of 2 size and 3 B/M groups. The portfolio SMB, which mimicked the risk 
factor related to size, was the difference between simple average of monthly returns on 3 
small-stock portfolios and that on 3 big-stock portfolios. The portfolio HML that 
mimicked the risk factor related to B/M ratio was defined similarly. The common 
variation in stock returns was largely captured by portfolios mimicking risk factors 
related to size and B/M ratio. The result pointed out that B/M ratio and market size 
could explain difference in average returns across stocks. Fama & French (1996) further 
examined whether this three-factor model could account for the difference in returns 
between portfolios formed on E/P ratio, C/P ratio and sales growth besides B/M ratio 
and size already done in 1993. They found that these anomalies largely disappeared in a 
three-factor model except for short-term returns. That is, 3-factor model also could 
capture the returns to portfolios formed on other fundamentals to price. 
However, the above studies did not identify the underlying risk factors. Size and 
B/M ratio were proxies for risk factors in returns for unexplained economic reasons. To 
fill this void, they (1995) examined whether the behavior of stock prices related to size 
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and B/M ratio was consistent with the behavior of earnings. They found that the market 
and size factors in earnings helped to account for the market and size factors in returns, 
but there was no evidence to indicate that the book-to-market factor in earnings driven 
the book-to-market factor in returns. 
Furthermore, they (1998) extended the study for other stock markets around the 
world. They suggested that an international capital asset price model did not seem to 
explain the value premiums. The value premiums in international returns could be 
captured by a two-factor model consisting of a risk factor for relative distress (an 
international version of HML). All the above evidence supported size and B/M ratio 
were proxies for risk and excess returns for value stocks just compensated for risks 
missed by CAPM. 
2.2.3 Expectation Error Hypothesis 
On the contrary, some scholars suggest investor expectation errors and 
institutional behavior to account for the difference in returns. LSV (1994) suggested 
that if value stocks underperformed glamour stocks in bad states of the economy, where 
marginal utility of wealth was high, value stocks would be riskier than glamour stocks. 
Thus, LSV compared performances of portfolios in the worst months for the U.S. stock 
markets such as economic recession, extreme down market and also considered other 
traditional measures such as CAPM betas, standard deviations over the sample period 
from 1968 to 1989. The result indicated that value stocks did not expose investors to 
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greater downside risk and were not fundamentally riskier than glamour stocks. Instead, 
they raised two explanations. First, they asserted investors tended to extrapolate past 
performance of firms to form their expectations. A company may get lucky one year but 
investors think the company is fundamentally superior and bid up the price. Or perhaps 
the company has grown very quickly for the past few years. Although the growth 
performance can hardly be repeated, investors think it can and so stock price increases 
now. On the other hand, investors are too pessimistic for stocks performed poorly in the 
past and anticipate them to still perform poorly in the future. In fact, it may turn out that 
glamour stocks underperform while value stocks outperform market anticipation. 
Investor expectations for value stocks revise upward and investors adjust their 
portfolios, leading to increases in prices and higher return of value stocks. Second, they 
suggested institutional investors had agency problems. Fund managers care more about 
their performance relative to the market index or that of other fund managers than about 
their absolute performance. They prefer to hold stocks that are constituents of the 
market index. These stocks tend to become overpriced. 
La Porta, Laknishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) provided further support for 
expectation errors hypothesis by observing price movement around earnings 
announcements for value and glamour stocks over 5 years after portfolio formation. 
They found that earnings announcement return of value stocks was higher than that of 
glamour stocks and the event return difference between portfolios accounted for a 
significant portion of annual return difference in post formation period. 
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Furthermore, Bauman, Conover and Miller (1999) identified value and growth 
stocks from twenty-one countries and measured their performance annually from 1986 
to 1996. Value and glamour stocks were formed on two separate criteria: price-to-book 
value ratio (P/B) and past three-year EPS growth rates. The evidence indicated investors 
seemed to overreact to past growth rates of EPS and their reaction resulted in overpriced 
glamour stocks and underpriced value stocks. They also found that investors and 
research analysts appeared to anticipate that past growth rates in EPS would sustain in 
the future. However, excessively high or low past growth rates in EPS tended to revert 
to the average level. Thus, the authors suggested that investors were disappointed 
towards the performance of glamour stocks and had positive surprise for that of value 
stocks after companies reported their earnings. This could explain why value stocks 
outperformed glamour stocks and provided evidence to support the extrapolation model 
o fLSV. 
In contrast to extrapolation of past growth, Basuman and Do wen (1994) La 
Porta (1996), who supported expectation error hypothesis, suggested that stock price 
reflected analysts' long term earnings growth forecasts even though their forecast were 
systemically biased. Earlier studies' found some characteristics of analyst forecasts. 
Analysts were greatly affected by past growth rates. Analyst forecasts were not able to 
distinguish clearly between permanent and temporary factors of past earnings 
performance in making their forecasts. These forecast errors tended to be positively 
serially correlated over time. Thus, Bauman and Dowen (1994) studied the relationship 
‘Mentioned in Bauman and Dowen (1994). For details, refer to Cragg and Malkiel (1968) Elton and 
Gruber (1987) Ali, Klein and Rosenfeld (1992). 
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between errors in company earnings forecasts and the earnings yield anomaly. I/B/E/S 
data file provided the consensus of EPS forecasts monthly from research analysts. Their 
results indicated that analysts tended to overestimate the EPS of low E/P stocks by a 
greater extent than that of high E/P stocks and hence stock returns were seriously 
affected by unexpected earnings. 
Moreover, La Porta (1996) suggested that two types of systematic errors led to 
superior return of value stocks: errors about risk and errors about earnings growth. 
Naive investors tended to regard value stocks to be riskier because they could not 
distinguish between systematic and non-systematic risks. Secondly, investors made 
systematic errors in forecasting the prospect of stocks. His study used analysts' forecast 
for 5-year earnings growth rate as a proxy of investors' expected growth rate. He found 
that analyst forecasts about the future earnings of glamour stocks were greatly higher 
than the actual performance. During post formation period, analysts revised their 
forecasts sharply for high and low expected growth stocks and the direction and extent 
of revision were consistent with what expectation error hypothesis predicted. Also, 
there was no evidence that low expected growth stocks had more risk than high-expected 
growth stocks. But the evidence for extrapolation model was mixed. 
There are two models of naive expectation formation conjectured to explain 
superior return of value strategy. One is naiVe extrapolation of past performance and 
another is biased analysts' earnings forecasts. Following studies examined the 
underlying source(s) of error behind the hypothesis. Dechow and Sloan (1997) used the 
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U.S. stock markets to examine the explanatory power of two naive investors' 
expectations models associated with different sources of error to higher returns of value 
stocks. The evidence did not support stock prices reflected naive extrapolation of past 
trends in earnings and sales growth. Past sales growths were higher in low B/M 
portfolios but there was no mean reversion in future sales growth. On the other hand, 
past sales growth was close across low E/P and high E/P portfolios while future sales 
growth was lower in high E/P portfolio. Past earnings was lower in low E/P stocks 
while future earnings growth was higher in low E/P portfolio. Thus, all the above 
patterns contradicted with what extrapolation model predicted. Instead, the evidence 
indicated that stock returns seemed to reflect analysts' forecasts of future earnings 
growth, consistent with La Porta (1996). Errors in analyst forecasts could explain over 
half of the higher returns to contrarian investment strategies in the United States. 
Besides, Levis and Liodakis (2001) used stocks listed on the London Stock 
Exchange and sorted portfolios on a basis of four measures: B/M ratio, E/P ratio, C/F 
ratio and past EPS growth. They found evidence supported the view that errors in 
expectations were likely due to biases in analysts' earnings forecasts rather than naive 
extrapolation of past growth. The evidence indicated investors did not extrapolate from 
the past and hence stock prices did not reflect naive extrapolation of past earnings 
growth or returns. In addition, the effects of positive and negative earnings surprises on 
returns of value and glamour stocks were asymmetrical. Positive surprise (good news) 
had a greater positive impact on the return of value stocks than that of other stocks. 
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Negative surprise (bad news) had a larger negative impact on the return of glamour 
stocks relative to value stocks. 
2.3 Studies for Value Strategy in Hong Kong 
There were some studies about value strategy in Hong Kong. Mak (1996) 
computed quarterly buy and hold return of value and glamour stocks formed on E/P 
ratio, B/M ratio and dividend to price (D/P) ratio. He provided evidence that investors 
could obtain higher returns by practising the value strategy in Hong Kong stock market 
during 1980-1992 sample period. For example, the average quarterly return of value 
stocks was 13.54% while that on glamour stocks was 6.39%, leading to a difference of 
7.15% per quarter. Then he used different risk measures such as standard deviations, 
coefficients of variation and CAPM betas and all the above measures did not indicate 
value stocks were systemically riskier than glamour stocks. In particular, value portfolio 
still outperformed glamour portfolio in bad quarters of the stock market and the local 
economy. This connoted that holding value stocks lost less in bad times and did not 
expose investor to larger downside risk. 
Also, the reward-to-risk ratios were higher for value stocks than glamour stocks. 
In addition, he computed two well-known composite portfolio performance measures for 
glamour and value portfolios: Treynor portfolio measure and Sharpe performance 
measure. No matter which portfolio measure used, risk adjusted performance of value 
portfolio was better than that of glamour portfolio. Furthermore, on average, he found 
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that the equity fund industry in Hong Kong could not beat the market and the correlation 
coefficient between the funds return and the return on Hang Seng Index was high. This 
might imply fund managers had agency problem in Hong Kong. 
Wong (1999) studied the performance of momentum, contrarian and value 
strategies in Hong Kong stock market, covering period from 1980 to 1994. The result 
showed that price momentum was weak in Hong Kong. For contrarian strategy, loser 
portfolio generated higher returns than winner portfolio. However, loser portfolio was 
systemically riskier than winner portfolio. Thus, the higher return of loser stocks might 
just a compensation for higher risks. 
For value strategy, portfolios were sorted by B/M ratio, E/P ratio and past sales 
growth. The annualized returns of value stocks were consistently higher than glamour 
stocks over periods varying from 12, 24, 36, 48 and 60 months. Value premiums 
persisted for size neutral subsamples. Size-neutral value stocks still did better than 
glamour stocks by sizeable amount in each size-based subsample generally. Besides, 
value premiums continued to exist after controlling for industrial composition of 
portfolios. In particular, the magnitude of B/M and E/P premiums in the entire sample 
and industry-neutral subsample were roughly the same. In addition, for subsample 
consisting of 33 Hang Seng Index constituent stocks, value stocks still generated higher 
returns than glamour stocks classified by B/M or E/P ratios although the return 
differences were substantially smaller than those in the entire sample. Using similar risk 
measures mentioned in Mak (1996), Wong also concluded value stocks were not 
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systemically riskier. Furthermore, he applied the Fama & French three-factor model 
(1993) to investigate whether the behavior of returns on portfolios could be explained by 
risk factors related to size and B/M ratio. Value premiums persisted in B/M portfolios 
and E/P portfolios even after taking mimicking risk factors related to size and B/M ratio 
into account. 
As previous studies in Hong Kong could not use risk factors to account for the 
superior performance of value portfolio, there must be other explanations existed. To 
fill this void, this thesis aims to apply expectation error hypothesis and investigate 
whether the source of error is related to naive extrapolation model by using methods 
suggested by LSV (1994) and La Porta and LSV (1997) to explain the performance of 
value stocks in Hong Kong stock market. The details of methodology and source of data 
are in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 3 
Data and Methodology 
In our study, we first compute annual buy and hold returns for value and glamour 
portfolios for 5 years after portfolio formation. The result indicates whether value 
stocks generate superior returns in Hong Kong stock market over time after portfolio 
formation. Then, we test whether expectation error hypothesis help account for this 
abnormal return. This is a different approach from previous studies on Hong Kong as 
previous works focused on risk-based explanation discussed in literature review. The 
details of our methodology and data source are presented as follows: 
3.1. Methodology of Expectation Error Hypothesis 
In reality, investors make errors in forming expectation. Sometimes, they are too 
optimistic for certain stocks (glamour stocks) and tend to overestimate the performance 
of these stocks and hence bid up their stock prices. This results in overpricing of 
glamour stocks with low E/P or B/M ratios. On the other hand, investors anticipate 
some stocks (value stocks) to perform badly in the coming future and so they sell them 
out now or do not invest in them which lead to lower price and higher E/P or B/M ratios 
of out of favour value stocks. Value strategy uses fundamental ratios such as E/P, B/M 
ratios as indicators to identify glamour and value stocks. Investors who carry out value 
strategy hold value stocks in their portfolios and sell glamour stocks. In fact, the future 
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performance of value stocks exceeds market anticipation while that of glamour stocks is 
below expectation. Later on, naive investors realize their errors and adjust their portfolio 
holdings. Their trading actions lead to increases in the price of value stocks and 
decreases in the price of glamour stocks. As a result, the returns of value stocks are 
higher than that of glamour stocks. The above is the assertion of expectation error 
hypothesis. 
Scholars suggest two main sources of errors to explain why naive investors make 
errors in expectation. The first one is related to company past sales and earnings 
growths. According to LSV (1994) investors tend to use past growth rate as a proxy to 
estimate the future growth rate of a company. They are too optimistic about the future 
performance of stocks with high growth rate in the past and too pessimistic for stocks 
with poor past performance. In fact, according to Little (1962), company performances 
are close to a random walk and hence past earnings growth performances are suitable 
only for very short time horizon forecasting. If investors tie their anticipations of future 
prospect to past growth with the belief that past growth rate will sustain in long run, they 
tend to forecast poor past performance stocks continue to perform badly in the coming 
future. This will result in lower price and higher E/P ratio or B/M ratio for value stocks. 
Vice versa, investors are too optimistic for the prospects of stocks with high past growth 
and bid up the stock prices. Later, it may turn out that glamour stocks do not live up to 
the expected growth. Investors will then readjust their expectations reflected in price 
movement. Value stocks' actual growth rates outperform the market perceived growths 
and their stock prices rise enormously which lead to higher returns than glamour stocks. 
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Another source of errors is related to analysts' biased forecasts. Some scholars 
suggest that investors form expectation based on analysts' forecasts. However, analysts 
may be systemically excessively optimistic for some stocks and pessimistic for other 
stocks. Investors prefer to buy those stocks with better prospect suggested by analysts 
and bid up these stock prices. The realization of actual performance in the future leads 
to positive surprises for value stocks and negative surprises for glamour stocks reflecting 
in price adjustment. However, since PACAP and DataStream in University Library do 
not collect analysts' earnings forecast data, it is not possible for us to test the expectation 
error related to analyst forecasts. Therefore, we only test LSV extrapolation model i.e. 
the first source of investor expectation errors in our study. 
3.1.1 Earnings Announcement Return 
Since expectation cannot be directly observed and expectation adjustment tends 
to take place most clearly around the time of corporate earnings announcement, we 
compute earnings announcement returns for value and glamour stocks to test whether 
earning surprises in the 5 years after portfolio formation are positive for value stocks and 
negative for glamour stocks. This will reflect investor reactions to earnings 
announcements and imply whether investors make errors in forecasting. As said above, 
if investors overestimate the performance of glamour stocks and underestimate that of 
value stocks, they will revise their expectations after companies announce their earnings. 
This adjustment will push down the price of glamour stocks and bid up the price of 
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value stocks. If our result indicates earnings announcement returns are positive for 
value stocks and negative for glamour stocks, it will support the expectation error 
hypothesis. 
3.1.2 Past and Future Earnings Growth Rates of Stocks 
Next, we will examine whether expectations embedded in stock prices are 
consistent with investors naively extrapolating from past earnings growth. 
According to Gordon's (1962) constant growth model, 
P = DI{r-g\ (1) 
where P is the stock price at the beginning of the current period. D is the dividend 
received at the end of current period, r is the required rate of return for the stock, g is 
the expected growth rate of dividends. Assume the dividend payout ratio p is constant, 
and then equation (1) can be rewritten as 
P j = r - g , (2) 
where E is earnings of the current period. This simple model indicates that E/P ratio 
rises with required rate of return and decreases with expected future earnings growth 
rate. This can be extended to other ratios as long as the numerator in that ratio 
represents a proxy for the firm's ability to produce cash flow in the current period. 
(Dechow & Sloan (1997))^ Thus, if we assume r is constant, E/P ratio will indicate the 
2 Mentioned in Dechow & Sloan (1997). For details of the use of book value of equity to be a proxy for 
free cash flow, refer to Miller and Modigliani (1961), Malkiel and Cragg (1970) & Ohlson (1995). 
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expected growth rate of stocks. A high expected growth rate leads to low E/P ratio and 
vice versa. In other words, stocks with low financial ratios like E/P ratio or B/M ratio 
(glamour stocks) indicate that investors associate these stocks with high-expected 
growth. 
In case of Hong Kong, previous studies, Mak (1996) and Wong (1999), used 
different risk measures, such as coefficients of variation, CAPM betas and performance 
of portfolios in bad states of the economy and stock market. They found no evidence to 
support the assertion that value stocks were riskier than glamour stocks. For instance, 
Mak (1996) found that CAPM p for value portfolio was just slightly higher than 
glamour portfolio sorted by E/P or B/M ratios. Wong (1999) got similar results that the 
difference in CAPM ft between two portfolios was not statistically significant from 
zero. Thus, according to Gordon's formula, it is reasonable to say glamour stocks with 
low E/P ratios or B/M ratios are mainly due to high-expected growth rate from investors. 
One possible test of the extrapolation hypothesis is as follows. Suppose 
investors form their expectations for the future growth of stocks based on various 
extrapolation rules, such as current earnings growth rate weighted-average earnings 
growth rate of the past 5 years with (or without) greater weight on more recent growth 
rate. In particular, Barsky and De Long (1993) found that using geometric-declining-
weighted-average rule was successful in fitting the U.S. aggregate stock market data. 
First, in our context, one would propose some extrapolation rules as proxy for expected 
growth rate. Then, relevant data such as required rate of return, expected growth rate 
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and dividend payout ratio could be plugged into Gordon's growth model to compute the 
implied E/P ratio of stocks and portfolios in the portfolio formation period. If the 
extrapolation hypothesis were applicable in Hong Kong stock market, the implied ratios 
would match with the actual data: lower for value stocks and higher for glamour stocks 
before formation. Thirdly, one could then examine the relationship between 
extrapolation rules as proxy for expected growth rate and the returns of value and 
glamour portfolios. 
However, this approach is subject to several constraints and so is not adopted 
here.3 The assumptions behind the Gordon's growth formula are restrictive such as 
constant dividends payout ratio across stocks and constant expected growth rate over 
time. It is also difficult to compute a proper required rate of return, which depends on 
risk. Hence, the test result is not reliable and robust. LSV (1994) claimed that investors 
extrapolated from corporate past performance to expect the future growth of companies 
and recognized the limitations of using Gordon's growth formula. LSV (1994) 
suggested that another test of this source of expectation error was to compare the past 
earnings growth rates and future earnings growth rates of glamour and value portfolios. 
If LSV argument is applicable in Hong Kong stock market, glamour stocks should grow 
faster than value stocks before portfolio formation. As the superior growth rate cannot 
be sustained, glamour stocks' growth rates begin to slow down during post formation 
period. On the contrary, value stocks will grow faster than before and converge or even 
exceed growth rate of glamour stocks that cause positive surprises to investors. 
3 The author is indebted to the external examiner for pointing out this approach. 
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3.2 Data Source 
Database for earnings announcement date is not available in Hong Kong. 
Although Wardley card contains relevant information, University Library only reserves 
the most recent record of Wardley card and does not keep the previous records. 
Alternatively, we use dividends announcement date as a proxy for this data since 
companies usually announce their earnings and declare their dividends on the same day. 
Dividend announcement date record is extracted from the CD-Rom 'Entitlement 
Record' published by Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEX) for the period from 1986 to 
2000. Entitlement Record is a collection of all announcements made by the companies 
listed on the main board of HKEX about stockholders' entitlements, including 
announcement dates, entitlement details and ex dividend dates, among others. Our 
sample includes all common stocks listed in Hong Kong Stock Exchange. 
The accounting, daily and monthly returns data of stocks are taken from the 
financial statements files of companies, daily stock price and returns files and monthly 
stock price and returns files respectively of the Pacific Basin Capital Markets (PACAP) 
database. This database is built up by the Sandra Ann Morsilli Pacific-Basin Capital 
Markets Research Center and College of Business Administration at the University of 
Rhode Island. It includes historical data of 9 countries' stock market in the Pacific-
Basin region. PACAP in the CUHK contains information up to 1998 but part of 
relevant data in 1998 is incomplete. Hence, this paper only covers the period from 1986 
to 1997. 
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3.3 Portfolio Formation 
Two ratios, book value to market equity (B/M) ratio and earnings to price (E/P) 
ratio, are used to classify stocks into portfolios. Book value is total stockholders' equity. 
Market value of equity is the market value (number of shares outstanding times price per 
share) of the company before portfolio formation date. E/P ratio is the ratio of earnings 
to market value of equity (earnings per share to stock price per share). Earnings of a 
listing company is the after tax net income before extraordinary items. 
Portfolios are formed at the beginning of January in each year t using accounting 
data available in previous year t-1 and the market value of stocks as at the last trading 
date of the December in previous year. We now use B/M ratio as an example to 
demonstrate the portfolio formation process. At the beginning of each year, B/M ratios 
of all listed companies are calculated and we sort stocks into deciles using all firms 
except those with negative B/M ratios. The first 10% of stocks, which have the highest 
B/M ratio, are value stocks. Glamour portfolio consists of stocks that have the lowest 
10% of B/M ratio. The portfolio is equally weighted with each stock receiving the same 
dollar investment. At the beginning of each year, B/M ratios are computed again and the 
portfolio is rebalanced so that all stocks in the portfolio have the same weight. Value 
stocks are those that market participants do not expect they have good future prospect, 
reflecting in low market value, high B/M ratio or high E/P ratio. Similar procedures are 
repeated by using E/P ratio to classify stocks. Following LSV (1994) stocks with 
negative E/P ratios are excluded when forming portfolio based on E/P ratio as negative 
E/P ratios cannot be interpreted in terms of expected growths. 
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In PACAP, once a stock is delisted from the exchange, no daily and monthly 
returns will be shown from that date onwards. Wong (1999) replaces the delisting return 
of a stock by the average return of the corresponding portfolio. However, reasons for 
delisting are mainly bankruptcy, merger with other company, acquisition by other 
company and privatization by large stockholders, among others. Thus, delisting returns 
are very different according to their own delist reasons. The average return of 
corresponding portfolio is not an appropriate proxy for delisting return and may 
introduce noise to the data. Hence, we decide to exclude these stocks during portfolio 
formation in this study. In addition, if a stock has missing returns in a year, we replace it 
by average return of the corresponding portfolio. Missing data is mainly due to no 
trading record resulting in no stock price and stock return. 
Company names and industry types of stocks in value and glamour portfolios 
formed annually according to B/M and E/P ratios from 1986 to 1997 are listed in 
Appendix A. 1 and A.2 respectively. 
3.4 Variable Calculation Method 
3.4.1 Annual Buy and Hold Returns 
Annual buy and hold returns and earnings announcement returns are calculated 
for each of our portfolios. Annual buy and hold returns with cash dividends reinvested 
are computed for 5 years after formation with Year 1 starting in January of Year t and 
ending in December of Year t. Annual return of a portfolio is the simple average of 
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returns on all stocks that belong to that portfolio.< As only monthly and daily returns of 
stocks are available in PACAP, the annual return of a stock is obtained by geometrically 
compounding the monthly returns. 
For instance, let r. be monthly return in Year t, i=l , 2 ... 12, Let R, be the 
annual return at Year t. Then, R, = (l + r, )(l + 2 )...(1 + - 1 
3.4.2 Earnings Announcement Returns 
Earnings announcement returns are measured over 3-day (t-1, t+1), 5-day (t-2, 
t+2), 7-day (t-3, t+3), 9-day (t-4, t+4) and 11-day (t-5, t+5) windows across 5 years after 
portfolio formation These event returns are measured half yearly as Hong Kong listing 
companies usually announce their earnings twice a year in general. A few companies 
give dividends quarterly and their earnings announcement returns are measured 
quarterly. Similarly, for each period, earnings announcement returns are equally 
weighted over all stocks in the portfolio to calculate a portfolio earnings announcement 
return. All event returns are then compounded into annualized returns in order to be 
compared with annual returns. 
4 Rates of returns of stocks are calculated in nominal terms. LSV (1994) La Porta and LSV (1997) and 
some other empirical studies did not deflate stock returns and dividends data by a price index. We 
compare the returns of value and glamour portfolios to investigate whether value stocks outperform 
glamour stocks. Even if we deflated the returns of value and glamour stocks in real terms, it would be 
likely that this did not have significant impact on the relative performance of value stocks or glamour 
stocks. 
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3.4.3 Earnings Growth Rate of Portfolios 
The procedure for computing growth rate of earnings of a firm and a portfolio is 
as follows. Use earnings growth rate from Year t to Year t+1 as an example. We invest 
$ 1 in each stock of the portfolio at the end of Year t. Thus, the proportion of each firm 
taken within the portfolio is 1/market capitalization where market capitalization is 
calculated at the last trading day of the December in Year t. For each stock in the 
portfolio, total firm earnings time the proportion of the stock owned, Earnings x 
(1/market capitalization) and then sum these numbers among all stocks in the portfolio 
in that year and divide by the number of stocks in the portfolio. Since earnings may be 
negative, but the growth rates cannot be computed when base year observation is 
negative. Besides, growth rates will be very volatile if base year earnings are close to 
zero. To deal with this problem, we follow the method used by LSV (1994). Before 
computing growth rate, we average portfolio earnings in Year t and Year t+1 over all 
formation periods. Thus, the earnings growth rate from Year t to Year t+1 
={AE,^^ -AE,)/AE, , where AE, and AE,^^ are the averages over all formation periods 
of portfolio earnings in Year t and Year t+1. 
Our sample period is from 1986 to 1997 as PACAP has complete data up to 1997 
only. In this part, we need 5 years accounting data before and after portfolio formation. 
Hence, due to data constraint, we just consider eight portfolio formation years from 1986 
to 1993. Furthermore, for portfolio financial ratios such as E/P ratio, we compute the 
ratio for each stock, and then take average over all stocks in the portfolio and then take 
average across all formation periods. 
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Chapter 4 
Interpretation of Results 
In this chapter, we present and interpret the results for annual returns, earnings 
announcement returns with different windows and earnings growth performance of 
value and glamour portfolios. To begin with, a summary of the descriptive statistics for 
portfolios sorted by B/M ratio and E/P ratio is presented in Table 1 to Table 4. 
Table 1 presents the number of stocks, average market capitalization of 
portfolios, standard derivations of rate of returns, maximum and minimum value of 
return for value stocks sorted by B/M ratio and Table 2 summarizes the details of 
glamour stocks sorted by B/M ratio for the period from 1986 to 1997. 'Year 0' in the 
tables represents the time at which portfolios forms at the beginning of each year. At 
the beginning of study period, the 1986 portfolio contained only 18 stocks. But as 
HKSE became more mature and expanded over time, the number of stocks in the 
portfolio had increased to 52 in 1997. For B/M portfolios, the average number of stocks 
was 32 over twelve portfolio formation years. Over the sample period, the mean of 
average market capitalization of glamour stocks was HK$10.1 billion, 10 times higher 
than that of value stocks, HK$868 million. This indicated that value stocks were mainly 
dominated by small-sized stocks. In each post formation year, the maximum and 
minimum rate of returns for both portfolios fluctuated across sample periods without a 
clear pattern. This might be correlated to economic factors at that particular period. On 
average, the maximum return of value stocks was higher than that of glamour stocks in 
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each post formation year and the minimum return of value portfolio was higher than that 
of glamour portfolio. The standard derivations of returns were volatile across sample 
periods in portfolios. On average, the standard derivation of returns for value portfolio 
was higher than that of glamour portfolio in each post formation year. 
Table 3 and 4 summarize the descriptive statistics of value and glamour 
portfolios sorted by E/P ratio respectively. In general, the number of stocks in portfolios 
increased from 14 in 1986 to 42 in 1997 continuously. The average number of stocks in 
portfolios was 28 over the sample period. Similar to B/M strategy, the average market 
value of glamour stocks was higher than that of value stocks in each formation year. 
The mean of average market capitalization of glamour stocks was HK$5,729 millions, 
approximately 8 times higher than that of value stocks, HK$706 millions. Moreover, the 
maximum, minimum returns and standard deviations for portfolios also fluctuated over 
the periods. The average standard derivations of value portfolio were slightly less than 
or close to that of glamour portfolio across periods except for Year 4. This is different 
from the attribute of B/M portfolios. 
We will discuss the performance of value and glamour portfolios in details in the 
following sections. 
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4.1 Annual Buy and Hold Returns of Portfolios 
4.1.1 Annual Returns of Portfolios Sorted by B/M Ratio 
Table 5 presents results on annual buy-and-hold returns for value and glamour 
portfolios classified by B/M ratio and E/P ratio. Panel A shows annual buy and hold 
returns of portfolios sorted by B/M ratio for 5 years after portfolio formation. Panel B 
presents annual buy and hold returns of portfolios sorted by E/P ratio. Returns were 
computed by averaging the returns in each year over the post formation periods in the 
sample. 
With reference to Table 5: Panel A, value stocks outperformed glamour stocks 
by 29.1 o/o 18.4 %, 11.1 % 19.6 % and 18.6 % respectively from Year 1 to Year 5 after 
portfolio formation. On average over these post formation years, glamour stocks had an 
average annual return of 14.2 % while value stocks had an average annual return of 33.6 
% leading to a difference of 19.3 % per year. The average annual return difference over 
5 post formation years was statistically significant at 5 % error level. The return of 
value stocks was higher than that of glamour stocks more than 10% in each post 
formation year. The difference in return was the greatest in Year 1 (29%). For Year 1 
and Year 2, the return differences were statistically significant at 5 % level. For Year 3 
Year 4 and Year 5 even though returns of value portfolio were still greater than that of 
glamour portfolio by more than 10 %, the return differences were not significant. 
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Table 6 presents the percentage of stocks that remained in value and glamour 
portfolios formed according to B/M ratio after one, two, three and four years. On 
average, the percentages of stocks that remained in value and glamour portfolios were 
about 50% after one year, 30% after two years, 20% after three years and 14% after four 
years. It was likely that investors discovered those stocks that had been perceived 'bad' 
(value stocks) in the past had in fact outperformed or exceeded their expectations. 
Hence, they revised their expectation upwards, hence reflecting increases in stock prices 
and higher returns of value stocks. Their B/M and E/P ratios went up and some of these 
stocks did not remain in the value portfolio in the following year. On the other hand, 
investors revised downwards the prospect of glamour stocks and these stocks left the 
glamour portfolio in the following year. 
4.1.2 Annua Returns of Portfolios Sorted by E/P Ratio 
With reference to Table 5: Panel B, portfolios classified by E/P ratio, value 
stocks generated higher annual returns than that of glamour stocks by 11.7%, 7.9%, 
8.9%, 3.0% and 7.1% respectively from Year 1 to Year 5. On average over five post 
formation years, glamour portfolio had an average annual return of 17.8 % while value 
portfolio had an average annual return of 25.6 % leading to a difference of 7.7% per 
year. This average annual return difference was statistically significant at 5% error 
level. For Year 1 and Year 5 return differences were significant at 10% level. For Year 
2 and Year 3 return differences were significant at 5% level. Like B/M strategy, the 
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difference in returns was also the greatest in Year 1 (11.7%). Except for Year 1 the 
return differences were less than 10% in the following years. 
Table 7 reports the percentage changes in the constituents of E/P portfolios 
across years. On average, approximately 26% of stocks stayed in value portfolios after 
one year, 6.5% stayed after two years and no stocks remained after three years. For 
glamour portfolios, percentages of stocks remained were about 34% after one year, 21% 
after two years, 10% after three years and 5% after four years. As a parallel situation to 
the performance of B/M portfolios, it was likely that investors eventually realized that 
performance of value stocks was better than initially expected and that of glamour stocks 
was poorer. This could also explain why the return differences tended to become less 
significant in the later years. 
4.1.3 Analysis of Performance on Return Differences between Two 
Ratios 
It was impressive that the average return difference between two portfolios 
sorted by B/M ratio was twice more than that sorted by E/P ratio. According to Table 5, 
value stocks sorted by B/M ratio generated average return of about 8% higher than those 
sorted by E/P ratio (for value portfolio, 33.6% in Panel A versus 25.6% in Panel B). On 
the other hand, the average return of glamour stocks classified by B/M ratio was 3.6% 
less than that sorted by E/P ratio (for glamour portfolio, 14.2% in Panel A versus 17.9% 
in Panel B). Wong (1999) also found that B/M premium was the greatest among B/M 
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ratio, E/P ratio and basis of past sales growth during 1980-1994 sample period. There 
are some possible explanations for this phenomenon. 
Firstly, it might be just a sample selection result. In each year, the number of 
stocks with negative E/P ratio was higher than that of stocks with negative B/M ratio, 
especially during recession. . For B/M portfolios, stocks were excluded before forming 
portfolios if they had negative B/M ratios. Similarly, stocks were excluded if they had 
negative E/P ratios for E/P portfolios. Firms with negative earnings in previous year 
might be largely affected by the local economic environment instead of its own 
performance. These firm performances would rebound in next year when the local 
economy recovered. Excluding these stocks might push down the return of value stocks. 
Thus, this might be a result of sampling problem. 
Besides, the rationale of value strategy is buying under-priced stocks and selling 
over-priced stocks. To determine overvalued and undervalued stocks, fundamental 
ratios such as E/P, B/M ratios are used as tools to measure the value of stocks. But the 
focuses of two ratios are different. E/P ratio focuses on firms' earnings capacity and 
investor expectations. The idea behind is based on Gordon's formula. If two firms have 
same earnings except one with higher growth perceived by investors based on available 
information, then investors buy this stock and bid up its price. Thus, stocks' low E/P 
ratio reflects naive investor enthusiasm towards these stocks and their high growth 
opportunities perceived. High E/P ratio stocks are defined as value stocks as their 
expected growth rates are low. Contrarian investors bet against naive investors by 
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buying stocks with high E/P ratio. On the other hand, B/M ratio concentrates on 
company net asset value. B/M ratio indicates how much more than book value investors 
are willing to pay for a company's common stock. For instance, B/M ratio of 0.8 
implies investors place a 25% premium on the stock. Thus, value strategy regards those 
stocks with high B/M ratios as value stocks against naive investors' view. As the 
criteria for selecting overpriced and underpriced stocks are different between two ratios, 
it is not surprising that annual return difference between two portfolios varies greatly, 
depending on which ratio used. 
Furthermore, E/P ratio is a more popular and common tool than B/M ratio for 
investors in Hong Kong. Many analysts and journalists usually mention stocks' E/P 
ratio rather than B/M ratio to support their views. Investors tend to perceive that E/P 
ratio has a larger explanatory power to tell the prospect of stocks. It is also easier for 
investors to get stock E/P ratio information, as E/P ratios of stocks are regularly updated 
and available in some financial websites and newspapers. 
In this section, the result was consistent with previous studies in Hong Kong 
such as Wong (1999) and Mak (1996). Value stocks generated higher returns than 
glamour stocks during post formation periods in Hong Kong stock market. The return 
difference between two portfolios was statistically significant in the first two to three 
years. The return differences between B/M portfolios were higher than E/P portfolios. 
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4.2 Earnings Announcement Returns for Value and Glamour 
Portfolios 
Table 8 presents results on earnings announcement returns for value and glamour 
portfolios using B/M classification. Table 9 summarizes results on earnings 
announcement returns for portfolios sorted by E/P ratio. Panel A, B, C, D and E present 
3-day, 5-day, 7-day, 9-day and 11-day earnings announcement returns respectively. 
Earnings announcement return of a portfolio was the simple average of earnings 
announcement returns of stocks in the portfolio. 
4.2.1 3-day event returns 
The result for 3 days event returns was not significant. Referring to Panel A of 
Table 8, the earnings announcement returns for both value and glamour portfolios sorted 
by B/M ratio were negative over all post formation years. This might be due to off 
loading of shares after announcement. Moreover, event returns for value stock were 
even slightly less than glamour stocks in the first and third year. In Year 2, 3-day event 
return of value stocks was higher than that of glamour stocks by 0.2% only. The 
difference in returns between value and glamour portfolios was not significant in the 
Year 2 based on t-test. In Year 4 and Year 5, 3-day event returns of value portfolio were 
negative but were higher than glamour stocks by more than 2%. However, the pattern of 
difference in 3-day event returns did not follow with that of annual buy and hold returns 
in Panel A of Table 5. 
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Besides, Panel A of Table 9 contains the result on 3-day event returns for 
portfolios classified by E/P ratio. The result was similar to that sorted by B/M ratio. 
The 3-day earnings announcement returns for both value and glamour portfolios were 
negative in 5 post formation years. The 3-day event return of value portfolio was less 
than that of glamour portfolio in Year 1. In Year 2, the event returns were close in both 
portfolios. The event returns for value stocks were higher than glamour stocks in Year 3 
and Year 4 by 1% and 0.56% respectively. The return difference was only significant in 
Year 3 at 10% error level. This pattern also did not follow with annual returns in Panel 
B of Table 5. Thus, either sorting by B/M or E/P ratios, the result of 3-day event returns 
did not support expectation error hypothesis. 
The above results were different from the U.S. study. La Porta and LSV (1997) 
used data from the United States stock markets to test the expectation error hypothesis to 
explain higher returns of value stocks. Their result for 3-day event returns was 
significant. 3-day quarterly earnings announcement returns were calculated for firms in 
the U.S. stock markets. The result indicated that 3-day event returns were substantially 
higher for value stocks than for glamour stocks. The difference in event returns was 
greater in Year 1 and Year 2 and became smaller in Year 3 4 and 5 with return 
differences significant in all 5 years. This fitted well with the evidence on annual 
returns. 
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However, the result of 3-day event returns was insignificant in Hong Kong. 
Apart from habitual selling after earnings announcements, there are two other possible 
explanations. In Hong Kong, the monitoring effort of Hong Kong Stock Exchange 
might not be as tight as in the United States. Some investors might get insider 
information before the announcement date. Also, analysts usually forecasted the 
performance of listing companies a week or longer before the announcement day and 
reported to the general public based on their research. Therefore, market investors might 
adjust their expectation and take action to buy or sell stocks a few days before the 
earnings announcement days. On the other hand, even if investors were surprised by the 
performance of companies, they need time to adjust their portfolios. So in fact, the 
surprising effect might spread over a longer period. Chan (1988) suggested that the 
price adjustment process began on day —41 before the earnings announcement and 
finished on day 17 after the announcement and most of price adjustment took place 
before earnings announcement according to his research. Hence, the 3-day window, 
which only captured three days performance of stocks, might not reflect the whole 
reaction of earnings surprise. Thus, we widened the window to 5-day, 7-day, 9-day and 
11-day to capture a longer duration of investor reaction around earnings announcement 
days. 
4.2.2 B/M Ratio: 5, 7 9 & 11 days Event Returns 
Panel B of Table 8 indicates that 5-day event returns of B/M portfolios. 5-day 
event returns for value stocks were slightly higher than zero in Year 1 and Year 2 and 
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then negative, around -1%, in later years. For glamour stocks, 5-day event returns were 
negative for all five post formation years. Value stocks' 5-day event returns were higher 
than glamour portfolio by 1 to 2% in Year 1 Year 2, Year 4 and Year 5. However, the 
return differences were not statistically significant among these years. 
According to Panel C of Table 8 7-day event returns were positive for value 
portfolio except for Year 3. For glamour stocks, 7-day event returns were all negative in 
post formation periods. The returns of value stocks were higher than that of glamour 
stocks in all post formation years, especially for Year 1 and Year 2. The differences in 
7-day returns between two portfolios were significant at 10 % error level in Year 1 Year 
2, Year 4 and Year 5. In Year 1 the 7-day event returns were 2.3% for value stocks and 
-0 .6% for glamour stocks, leading to 2.9% difference. In Year 2, the event returns were 
2.5% for value portfolio and -2 .0% for glamour portfolio, leading to 4.5% difference, 
the greatest difference among 5 years. The difference in return between value and 
glamour portfolios still persisted in Year 4 and Year 5 with smaller magnitude. The 
above result indicated that positive earnings surprise for value stocks and negative 
surprise for glamour stocks. 
The result of Panel D was similar to Panel C of Table 8. 9-day event returns for 
value stocks were positive for all years except for Year 3 and negative for glamour 
stocks in each of the five post formation years. In Year 1, the difference in event returns 
between portfolios was 4.1% that represented approximately 14% of the difference in 
Year 1 annual returns. The difference in returns was 5.4% in Year 2, the greatest among 
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5 years, which represented around 29 % of the difference in Year 2 annual returns. 
Differences in 9-day event returns still existed in Year 4 and Year 5 with smaller 
amount. 
Panel E of Table 8 presents 11-day announcement returns for value and glamour 
portfolios classified by B/M ratio. The returns of value stocks were positive and 
substantially higher than glamour stocks across all post formation years, especially in the 
first and second year. The returns of glamour stocks were negative in all post formation 
years. The difference in returns between two portfolios was significant in each year. In 
Year 1 the 11-day announcement returns were -0 .36% for glamour stocks 
and 5% for value stocks. This implied a relative disappointment in the earnings 
performance of glamour stocks. The difference of 5.6% return, realized over 22 trading 
days, represented approximately 20% of first year annual return difference between 
portfolios reported in Panel A of Table 5. The difference in Year 1 event return was 
significant at 5 % level. The result for Year 2 was also qualitatively similar. The 
difference in 11-day event returns was the largest in Year 2 about 8%, representing 45% 
of difference in Year 2 annual returns. The difference in announcement returns 
continued from Year 3 to Year 5 although the magnitude of the differences in later years 
was smaller than in the first two years. 
In summary, qualitative results of 7-day, 9-day and 11-day event returns were 
similar. In general, the returns for value stocks were positive in Year 1 Year 2 Year 4 
and Year 5 and negative for glamour stocks over all post formation years. Value stocks' 
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event returns were higher than glamour stocks and the differences were statistically 
significant in post formation period except for Year 3 generally. This result suggested 
that positive updating on earnings prospects of value stocks relative to glamour stocks 
took place quite slowly. The substantial differences between value and glamour 
portfolios in Year 1 and Year 2 fitted well with the result of annual buy and hold returns 
since the annual return differences between two portfolios were statistically significant 
in the first two years. As event returns were positive for value stocks and negative for 
glamour stocks in five post formation years, this evidence supported expectation error 
hypothesis. 
4.2.3 E/P Ratio: 5, 7, 9 & 11 Days Event Returns 
Panel B of Table 9 reports 5 days event return of portfolios sorted by E/P ratio. 
Glamour and value portfolios' 5-day earnings announcement returns were negative 
across all post formation years. The 5-day event returns were still higher for value 
stocks than for glamour stocks in first four years. The difference in 5-day event return 
was only significant in Year 2. The result of 7-day event return was just qualitative 
close to 5-day event return. The exception was that 7-day event return for value stocks 
was slightly higher than zero in Year 1. The other qualitative characteristics were just 
the same. 
According to Panel D of Table 9 9-day event returns for value stocks were 
positive in first four years and negative in Year 5. 9-day event returns for glamour 
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stocks were slightly higher than zero in Year 1 and negative in the following years. In 
Year 1 the difference in return was 1.9 % which took about 17% of difference in Year 
1 annual returns between portfolios. The difference in event return was 3.5% in Year 2, 
taking about 45% of difference in Year 2 annual returns. The differences still persisted 
in Year 3 and Year 4 but were not statistically significant. 
With reference to Panel E of Table 9 value stocks' 11-day event returns were all 
positive over five post formation years. 11 days event returns of glamour stocks were 
1% in Year 1 slightly higher than zero in Year 3 and Year 4 and slightly below zero in 
Year 2 and Year 5. In Year 1 and Year 2, the differences in 11-day return were 
significant at 10 % level. Although value stocks' 11 days event returns were still higher 
in the following years, the magnitudes were smaller and not statistically significant. 
For E/P portfolios, the results of 9-day and 11-day event returns indicated that 
earnings surprise was positive for value stocks and investors were disappointed for the 
earnings performance of glamour stocks reflected in earnings announcement returns. 
This was consistent with expectation error hypothesis. 
From the above results of B/M and E/P portfolios, earnings announcement 
returns were sensitive to the length of window. For 3-day and 5-day windows, the 
announcement returns were negative for both value and glamour stocks. When we 
extended the window to 9-day and 11-day, the announcement returns were positive for 
value stocks and negative for glamour stocks. We can conjecture the following 
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explanation to the phenomenon. Stock price adjusts when new information comes and 
reflects investor reactions. If there is no information leakage, investors receive earnings 
information of companies on announcement date. The price of value stocks rises 
immediately as investors realize the performance of value stocks exceed market 
expectation while the price of glamour stocks fall. Thus, earnings announcement returns 
with short window such as 3 day should be positive for value stocks and negative for 
glamour stocks, like the U.S evidence (La Porta and LSV (1997)). If information 
leakage exists, investors know the earnings performance of companies before 
announcement day and their trading actions lead to increases or decreases in stock prices 
earlier a few days before announcement days. Thus, when we widened the length of 
trading days covered, the result became significant and supported expectation error 
hypothesis by using Hong Kong data. Moreover, if return differences are evenly 
distributed throughout 247 trading days in a year i.e. no sudden earnings announcement 
impact, difference in earnings announcement returns over 22 trading days i.e. 11 days 
window should account approximately 9% of annual return difference 
(i.e.22/247*100%). In reality, we note that under 9-day and 11-day windows, the 
earnings announcement return differences accounted for approximately 18% (greater 
than 9% as just mentioned) of annual return difference between value and glamour 
portfolios in Year 1 and 45% in Year 2. This indicated earnings announcement was a 
major event that led to the return difference of glamour and value stocks. 
In this section, we note that the result of earnings announcement returns with 
shorter window like 3-day and 5-day did not support expectation error hypothesis. 
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When we widened the window to 9 days and 11 days, the results were significant and 
consistent with the hypothesis. This suggested errors in anticipating the future prospects 
of firms played an important role in the superior return of value stocks. Earnings 
announcement returns with longer windows for value stocks were positive and higher 
than for glamour stocks during post formation periods. Earnings announcement returns 
accounted for a definite proportion of the annual returns differences and this 
phenomenon might be the result of investors' continuous revision about their 
expectations when they receive new information. Though earnings announcement might 
be a major source of information that led to expectation revision, the event return 
difference might account for a large portion of the returns premiums but not all. 
4.3 Past and Future Earnings Growths of Portfolios 
In previous section, the result of 9-day and 11-day earnings announcement 
returns supported expectation error hypothesis. Hence, the next step is to investigate the 
source of expectation error. LSV (1994) suggested that a lot of psychological evidence 
indicated people formed their expectations of future without considering mean reversion. 
People tended to form their expectations based on past data and often had extreme 
prediction even the reliability and predictability of information were low. Thus, LSV 
(1994) believed that naive investors made expectation errors since they expected stocks 
with good past performance could sustain and in fact the good performance could not be 
realized in the future. 
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This section follows LSV (1994) method to examine whether investor 
expectation error is related to past performance of firms measured in terms of earnings 
growth. 
4.3.1 Fundamental Variables, Prior and Post Returns of Portfolios 
As PACAP does not contain cash flow data, we just focus on earnings growth of 
firms as a measure of firm performance. Table 10 describes the attributes of glamour 
and value portfolios in terms of financial ratios, prior and post formation returns. Panel 
A describes the characteristics of portfolios sorted by B/M ratio. Value stocks had 
higher B/M ratio and E/P ratio relative to glamour stocks. This implied investors 
expected value stocks with lower growth or poor prospect. The annualized geometric 
mean of glamour stocks' returns was higher than that of value stocks by 30% over three 
years before portfolio formation. The annualized geometric buy and hold return for 
value portfolio was higher than glamour portfolio by 28% over three post formation 
years. According to Panel B, value stocks also had relatively higher B/M ratios and E/P 
ratios, using E/P ratio classification. The annualized geometric return of glamour stocks 
was 13.5% higher than that of value stocks before formation. The annualized geometric 
return of value stocks was higher than glamour stocks by 15.5% over three post 
formation years. 
LSV (1994) found that in terms of earnings and cash flow growth rates, glamour 
stocks had grown much faster than value stocks before portfolio formation and then 
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slowed down. For post formation period, the growth rate of value portfolio rose and 
caught up with glamour stocks. This progress was particularly significant beyond the 
first few years. Thus, LSV (1994) suggested the evidence in the U.S. stock markets 
supported the argument that expectation errors were related to past growth of firms. If 
LSV extrapolation argument were applicable in Hong Kong stock market, investors 
would extrapolate from past performance of firms to make anticipation. Hence, we 
should observe earnings growth rate of glamour stocks was higher than that of value 
stocks before formation and then slowed down while that of value stocks was higher 
than before formation and might catch up with glamour stocks during post formation 
period. 
4.3.2 Earnings Performance of Portfolios 
B/M portfolios 
Table 11 presents the earnings, annual earnings growth rate, and annualized 
geometric earnings growth rate of B/M portfolios in 5 years prior and post formation 
periods. Panel A points out the average earnings of portfolios from Year - 6 to Year 5. 
Panel B presents the annual earnings growth rate of portfolios from Year - 5 to Year 5. 
Panel C reports the annualized geometric earnings growth rates across Year (-5 0) Year 
(-4’ 0) Year (-3’ 0) ... Year (0 1) Year (0 2) " . Year (0 5) periods. It is easier to 
interpret the result by graphics. Thus, Figure 1, 2 and 3 correspond to Panel A, B and C 
of Table 11 respectively in graphics. The number ‘0’ within parenthesis of time period 
in tables and figures means the time when we form portfolios. For instance, Year (a, 0) 
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represents the time period from the beginning of Year a to the time just before forming 
portfolios. Year (0 b) represents the time period from the time we form portfolios to the 
end of Year b. 
According to Fig. 1 earnings of value portfolio decreased from Year —6 to Year 
- 3 and then rose up to Year 1. Earnings of value portfolio rose dramatically in Year 1 
but then dropped greatly in Year 2 and rose again up to Year 4. Overall, earnings of 
value portfolio exhibited an upward trend from Year -5 to Year 5. On the other hand, 
earnings of glamour stocks fluctuated without a clear up and down trend from Year - 6 to 
Year 5. 
With reference to Fig. 2, the annual earnings growth rate of glamour stocks was 
higher relative to value stocks only in Year - 5 Year - 4 and Year - 1 during prior 
formation period. In Year - 3 and Year -2, earnings growth rates of value stocks were 
higher. During post formation periods, value stocks grew faster than glamour stocks 
except for Year 2 and Year 5. The growth rate of glamour stocks in Year 2 was 111% 
and that of value stocks was —60%. Following LSV argument, value stocks should grow 
faster than before portfolio formation and hence exceeded investors' expectation. 
However, the overall pattern did not demonstrate this characteristic. As the performance 
of value stocks was poorer than glamour stocks in Year 2 average annual return of value 
stocks should be lower than that of glamour stocks as the earnings performance of value 
stocks made investors disappointed. In fact, annual buy and hold return of value stocks 
was higher than glamour stocks by 23% in Year 2 during 1986-1993 sampling period. 
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The annual growth rate patterns of two portfolios actually fluctuated from year to year 
without any up and down trend. 
Furthermore, LSV (1994) computed geometric annualized earnings growth rate 
across periods (-5 0) 0 5) and (2 5) to capture the earnings performance of stocks, we 
also computed this rate and displayed in Fig. 3. However, annualized geometric growth 
rates of value portfolio were higher than glamour stocks across various periods except 
for (-1 0) and (0, 2). Thus, overall, only the growth rate pattern between Year - 1 and 
Year 1 was consistent with LSV extrapolation model. In general, growth rate pattern of 
B/M portfolios did not follow with the prediction of naiVe extrapolation model. 
E/P portfolios 
Table 12 presents the earnings, annual earnings growth rate, and annualized 
average earnings growth rate of portfolios sorted by E/P ratio over 5 years prior and post 
formation periods. Figure 4 5 and 6 correspond to Panel A, B and C of Table 12 
respectively. Average earnings of glamour portfolio in Year -4 were negative, -0.04. As 
said before, when growth rate is calculated, the denominator cannot be negative. Thus, 
earnings growth rates of glamour portfolio in Year -3 were not available in Panel B and 
Panel C of Table 12. Besides, in Panel C of Table 12, we change to compute annualized 
average growth rate instead of geometric growth rate. In Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 the lines 
representing growth rate of glamour portfolio were discrete with missing part because of 
the above missing rates in Year -3. 
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With reference to Fig. 4 earnings of value portfolio increased from Year 5 to 
Year - 2 rapidly and then exhibited a downward trend for years after. It fell in Year - 1 
and rebounded in Year 1 and decreased up to Year 5. On the contrary, earnings of 
glamour portfolio decreased from Year - 6 to Year -4 . Thereafter, it rose up to Year 2 
and then fell gradually in the following years. In short, average earnings of glamour and 
value portfolio converged in post formation period and became very close to each other 
in Year 5. 
According to Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 growth rate of glamour stocks converged with 
that of value stocks during post formation period, partly followed with the prediction of 
extrapolation hypothesis. However, the overall growth pattern of portfolios contradicted 
with LSV assertion. Earnings growth rate of two portfolios in Fig. 5 were negative and 
close to each other in Year - 5 . From Year - 5 to Year - 2 , annual earnings growth rate of 
value portfolio rose continuously and reached the peak in Year -2. In Year - 2 , earnings 
of glamour stocks still did not restore to original level in Year - 5 . Thus, the overall 
earnings growth rate was substantially higher for value portfolio throughout the period (-
5, -2). From Year —1 to Year 5 the annual growth rates of glamour portfolio were 
higher than that of value portfolio. The annual earnings growth rates of both portfolios 
were negative from Year 3 to Year 5 however, glamour stocks' annual earnings growth 
rates were still higher than value stocks. Furthermore, during post formation period, the 
overall earnings growth performance of value stocks was worse than before formation. 
If investors extrapolated from past performance of firms, they would expect value stocks 
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that had negative earnings growth rates in Year - 1 to sustain poor performance in the 
future. Hence, following LSV (1994) assertion, holding value stocks would not generate 
superior returns since investor expectations realized in post formation periods and 
investors did not have positive earnings surprises on value stocks. This contradicted to 
the fact that value stocks generated higher returns in post formation periods and was 
obviously inconsistent with what extrapolation model predicted. According to Fig. 6, 
from Year - 2 to Year 5, the annualized average earnings growths of glamour portfolio 
were higher than value portfolio across different periods. In general, E/P portfolios also 
displayed growth characteristics which were inconsistent with LSV assertion that 
investors extrapolated from past performance of companies to form their expectations. 
In theory, LSV argued investors made expectation based on past performance of 
firms. They would buy those stocks with high past earnings growth and bid up stock 
prices. Stocks with low past earnings growth would be sold. Hence, using Hong Kong 
data, we should observe that earnings growth rates of glamour stocks were higher before 
portfolio formation and then decreased or slowed down while growth rates of value 
stocks increased during post formation period. However, according to the above result, 
earnings growth pattern of B/M and E/P portfolios indicated these characteristics only 
between Year - 1 and Year 1 and were inconsistent in all other years. Overall, past and 
future earnings growth patterns of portfolios did not suggest that the superior returns to 
value strategy arose from expectation errors related to investors extrapolating from past 
growth of firms. 
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Another source of expectation error suggested by scholars is analysts' biased 
forecasts. This may be applicable in Hong Kong. For example, in Year -1 analysts 
were very pessimistic for the prospect of value stocks in Year 1. Investors took the 
advice of analysts and did not invest in value stocks. As a result of low stock price, value 
stocks' financial ratios remained high. In Year 1 earnings growth rate of value stocks 
was higher than analyst expectation while that of glamour stocks was lower than analyst 
expectation. When investors realized analyst forecast errors and adjusted their portfolio 
holdings, their trading actions led to increases in the price of value stocks and decreases 
in the price of glamour stocks, and so the returns of value stocks were higher than that of 
glamour stocks. However, in Hong Kong, there is no database that collects analysts' 
forecasts data on the stocks. Hence, we cannot test this source of expectation errors in 
this study. 
4.3.3 Factors Affect Investor Expectation 
LSV (1994) suggested the evidence using the U.S. stock markets was consistent 
with expectation errors that related to investors based on past performance of companies 
to form prediction. However, evidence in Hong Kong stock market did not support this 
assertion. As our sample period of eight years might not be sufficiently long enough, it 
was possible that the result would be better if our sample covered longer periods with 
more data available to reduce noise. But if this was not related to sampling limitations 
and the result in section 4.2 indicated that Hong Kong investors had expectation errors 
towards the performance of value and glamour portfolios in post formation period, this 
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implied Hong Kong investors did not form expectation solely based on firms' past 
performance but also considered other factors. 
In fact, Hong Kong is a small but open economy with a linked exchange rate 
system. Investors usually consider external factors in particular the economic condition 
of the United States. As interest rate in Hong Kong must follow with the U.S. interest 
rate to maintain linked exchange rate system, Hong Kong stock market therefore follow 
closely the trend of the U.S. stock markets' performance. 
Besides, stock price is merely pricing perceptions of the future. Investors like to 
buy stocks based on 'concept' and anticipate certain kinds of stocks to perform well in 
the future. For example, when 'China Fever" came in Hong Kong stock market in 1993 
and 1994 investors were very enthusiastic towards buying H-shares, red chips and 
stocks whose business related to mainland. As mainland had over 11 billion population 
and continuously increasing GDP per capita, demand for high quality consumer goods 
and other services was very huge. Investors anticipated those firms with business 
connected with mainland to have high growth in the future and all were excited to buy 
these stocks and bided up their stock prices regardless of past performance of these 
firms. Five years later, 'technology stocks' became investors' preference. Stock prices 
of technology companies boosted up very quickly while most of these companies' past 
performance were not excellent. Some were new established companies for listing such 
as the IPO of TOM.COM. This might suggest glamour stocks were just a result of 
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swings of investor sentiment and these bubble syndromes were not related to past 
growth as investors bought stocks mainly based on perception of future. 
Hong Kong investors also like to get analyst forecasts as reference. As each 
company has its own characteristics together with local and external factors to be 
considered. Many investors do not have such time and knowledge to make judgment on 
stocks' future performance. They believe analysts have expertise knowledge and their 
advices are more accurate. In fact, analyst anticipation may also have errors and biases 
that lead to investor expectation error. 
Hong Kong investors consider other factors such as analyst forecasts, trend 
chasing, industry prospects and growth opportunities, among others. Thus, evidence 
from Hong Kong data was different from that found in LSV (1994) study using the U.S. 
data. Investor expectation errors were likely a combined result of many factors 
considered by investors. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
Using information in the public domain, value strategy identifies stocks 
that appear to be undervalued by the market and invests in them. Lakonishok, Shleifer, 
and Vishny (1994) found evidence in the U.S. that annual return of value stocks was 
significantly higher than that of glamour stocks, which were stocks that appeared to be 
overvalued by the market. The implication that the equity stock may not be 
informational efficient is intriguing. In Hong Kong, the same pattern of stock price 
behavior has been observed. In addition, there was evidence that the superior return of 
value stocks could not be explained by higher degree of risks. This study proposes that 
the superior return of value stocks in HKSE was a result of investor expectation error. 
The study obtains the following findings. 
Firstly, value stocks generated higher returns than glamour stocks in the first few 
years after portfolio formation with the greatest difference in returns occurred in the first 
year during 1986-1997 sample period. The return differences between two portfolios 
were statistically significant in the first two to three years generally. This might indicate 
that market investors realized that those stocks perceived 'bad' in the past outperformed 
their expectations. Hence, they adjusted their anticipation after one to two years and the 
difference in returns became less significant in later years. It was interesting that the 
annual return difference between two portfolios for B/M strategy was higher than that 
for E/P strategy in each post formation year. 
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Since expectation could not be directly measured and expectation adjustments 
tended to take place most clearly around the time of corporate earnings announcement, 
earnings announcement returns for value and glamour stocks were computed to indicate 
whether investors made errors in expectation. The results for 3-day and 5-day event 
returns were not significant. For 3 and 5 days window, the earnings announcement 
returns for value and glamour portfolios were negative over all post formation years. 
This might be due to off loading of shares after earnings announcements, information 
leakage and reaction lag. Thus, we widened the window to capture a longer duration of 
investor reaction. The results of 9 and 11 days event returns were consistent with the 
hypothesis. Overall, the earnings announcement returns of longer window were positive 
for value stocks and negative for glamour stocks in post formation period. This 
indicated positive earnings surprise for value stocks and negative surprise for glamour 
stocks. According to 9 days and 11 days returns results, difference in earnings 
announcement returns accounted for approximately one-sixth of annual return difference 
between value and glamour portfolios in Year 1 and 45% in Year 2 after portfolio 
formation. Thus, expectation error hypothesis played an important role in explaining the 
superior return generated by value stocks in Hong Kong stock market. 
Furthermore, if investors extrapolated from past performance of firms to form 
expectation, we should observe earnings growth rate of glamour stocks was higher than 
value stocks before formation and then slowed down while that of value stocks increased 
during post formation period. In general, earnings growth patterns of portfolios sorted 
. •• • 
by either ratio were inconsistent with what LSV extrapolation model predicted in post 
formation periods and partly followed the prediction only between Year - 1 and Year 1. 
For E/P portfolios, the average growth rate of earnings was higher for value portfolio 
than glamour portfolio from Year - 5 to Year -2 . From Year -1 to Year 5 the earnings 
growth rates of glamour stocks were higher than that of value stocks. The average 
annual earnings growth rate of value stocks was lower in post formation period than 
before portfolio formation. B/M portfolios also displayed growth patterns inconsistent 
with LSV assertion. Overall, past and future earnings growth patterns of portfolios did 
not suggest that the higher return of value stocks arose from expectation error associated 
with investors extrapolating from past growth of companies. 
The above results might imply that source of expectation error in Hong Kong 
was different from the United States. To form expectation, Hong Kong investors 
consider other factors such as analysts' forecast, perception of future, industry prospects 
and growth opportunities, among others. Thus, the hypothesis that investors extrapolate 
from the past growth performance of companies, which leads to expectation errors, are 
not supported by the Hong Kong data. 
In theory, it is possible to buy value stocks and short sell glamour stocks to gain 
without any cos t The database used in this study includes all common stocks in the 
HKSE from 1986 to 1997. However, in Hong Kong, not all listing companies' common 
stocks are allowed for short selling except for those who satisfy certain strict criteria put 
forward by Hong Kong Stock Exchange. Until 1994 Hong Kong Stock Exchange had 
. •• • 
begun to allow investors to borrow stocks for short selling and only 17 stocks were 
permitted at that time. Until now, 155 designated securities are eligible for short selling. 
Moreover, as the risk of short selling is very high and the procedure is quite 
complicated, individual investors and small investment companies seldom do this except 
for large foreign investment companies. In addition, it is still possible that investors 
hold value portfolios to bet against the market on average over a long period of time. 
But, long-term investors prefer to buy and hold blue chips rather than value stocks 
dominated by small-sized stocks as they regard blue chips to be safer and longer life in 
Hong Kong. Investors may also suffer temporary loss by holding value stocks in the 
short run. It is doubtful that investors are willing to commit the capital to maintain value 
strategy over a long period. Furthermore, individual investors may not bother to gather 
the information and spend time to compute E/P and B/M ratios of all stocks and then 
classify them into deciles. In fact, B/M ratio of all stocks may not be easily obtained. 
On the other hand, institutional investors may have agency problem and have preference 
over blue chips in their portfolios. Thus, investors in Hong Kong are not likely to 
practice the value strategy. 
Besides, difference in earnings announcement returns took a definite proportion 
of difference in annual returns between portfolios. This might imply other behavior and 
institutional factors accounted for part of the superior return to value strategy. Value 
stocks were mainly high B/M ratio, high E/P ratio and small-sized stocks. Individual 
investors know little about out of favour value stocks. Many investors tend to believe 
large blue chips are more profitable and less risky to invest regardless of their current 
. •• • 
price levels. On the other hand, institutional investors should be more professional and 
have enough resources and knowledge to buy value stocks. In fact, institutional 
investors may also prefer to buy glamour stocks due to agency problem. Firstly, it is 
easier for institutional investors to justify glamour stocks to their customers as investing 
in glamour stocks are usually regarded as 'prudent' investment (LSV (1994)). 
Moreover, the performances of funds are usually compared with the returns on Hang 
Seng Index. A value strategy may take few years to bet against the market on average 
and underperfon-n the market in the meantime. In order to avoid underperforming the 
index, fund managers may prefer to hold Hang Seng Index constituent stocks into their 
portfolios. In addition, the price of small size stocks can be affected easily by deliberate 
manual large trading and hence value stocks are more uncertain from investors' point of 
view. Hence, all the above investor behaviors may be one of possible explanations for 
higher return of value stocks. 
As our sample period covered only twelve years, it might not be long enough to 
get robust result. It is possible that the result would be more clear and certain if our 
sample covers longer periods and have more data to reduce noise. Nevertheless, our 
result pointed out that expectation error played a role to account for the superior return 
of value stocks. As the source of error is still unknown, factors like analysts biased 
forecast and other behaviour model are topics of further research. 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Annual Buy-and-Hold Returns on Glamour and Value Portfolios 
Classified by B/M and E/P Ratios, 1986-1997 
Panel A: B/M 
Value Glamour Difference t-statistics 
V-G 
Yr1 0.43508 0.14367 0.29141 2.559 ** 
Yr2 0.28454 0.10085 0.18369 2.037 ** 
Yr3 0.28640 0.17575 0.11066 0.953 
Yr4 0.31534 0.11956 0.19578 1.278 
Yr5 0.35733 0.17160 0.18573 1.402 
AR 0.33574 0.14229 0.19345 6.7127 ** 
Panel B: E/P 
Value Glamour Difference t-statistics 
V-G 
Yr1 0.33044 0.21356 0.11689 1.374 * 
Yr2 0.26373 0.18484 0.07889 2.073 ** 
Yr3 0.24448 0.15554 0.08894 2.209 ** 
Yr4 0.23491 0.20479 0.03012 0.653 
Yr5 0.20632 0.13493 0.07139 1.825 * 
AR 0.25598 0.17873 0.07724 5.485 ** 
Remarks 
** significant at 5% error level 
* significant at 10% error level 
AR refers to the average of annual buy-and-hold returns over 5 post formation years 
. •• • 
Table 6 
Percentage of Stocks Remained in Value and Glamour Porfolios 
Classified by B/M Ratio Across Years 
Panel A: % Remained in Value Portfolios 
Year After One Year After Two Years After Three Years After Four Years 
1987 47.4 10.5 10.5 5.3 
1988 30.0 15.0 5.0 5.0 
1989 45.8 29.2 25.0 20.8 
1990 57.7 38.5 23.1 11.5 
1991 56.0 36.0 20.0 20.0 
1992 62.1 41.4 31.0 24.1 
1993 54.3 31.4 25.7 20.0 
1994 51.2 36.6 22.0 
1995 63.0 43.5 
1996 62.5 
Average 51.2 29.9 18.0 13.3" 
Panel B: % Remained in Glamour Portfolios 
Year After One Year After Two Years After Three Years After Four Years 
1 9 ^ TSJ ^ 
1987 31.6 10.5 10.5 10.5 
1988 45.0 30.0 30.0 20.0 
1989 50.0 45.8 25.0 16.7 
1990 61.5 30.8 19.2 11.5 
1991 40.0 24.0 20.0 20.0 
1992 34.5 24.1 24.1 20.7 
1993 40.0 28.6 20.0 17.1 
1994 61.0 41.5 31.7 
1995 58.7 39.1 
1996 54.2 
Average 46.8 29.1 20.7 15.3 
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Table 7 
Percentage of Stocks Remained in Value and Glamour Porfolios 
Classified by E/P Ratio Across Years 
Panel A: % Remained in Value Portfolios 
Year After One Year After Two Years After Three Years After Four Years 
“ 1 9 8 6 2AA 
1987 42.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1988 26.3 10.5 0.0 0.0 
1989 23.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1990 16.7 8.3 0.0 0.0 
1991 39.1 13.0 0.0 0.0 
1992 26.9 3.8 0.0 0.0 
1993 20.6 2.9 0.0 0.0 
1994 17.9 2.6 0.0 
1995 15.9 2.3 
1996 22.0 
Average 25.5 6.5 0.0 O.O" 
Panel B: % Remained in Glamour Portfolios 
Year After One Year After Two Years After Three Years After Four Years 
~ 1 9 8 6 2 i A ^ ^ 
1987 21.4 7.1 7.1 0.0 
1988 47.4 36.8 15.8 10.5 
1989 47.6 19.0 9.5 4.8 
1990 29.2 8.3 4.2 4.2 
1991 30.4 21.7 13.0 13.0 
1992 38.5 19.2 15.4 7.7 
1993 38.2 23.5 11.8 8.8 
1994 38.5 15.4 10.3 
1995 38.6 20.5 
1996 24.4 
Average 34.1 17.2 9.7 6.1~ 
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Table 8 
3 5 7 9 and 11 Days Earnings Announcement Returns on Glamour and Value 
Portfolios Classified by B/M Ratio 
Panel A: 3 days 
BM Value Glamour Difference t-statistics 
V-G 
Yr1 -0.01064 -0.00627 -0.00437 
Yr2 -0.00810 -0.01026 0.00216 0.128 
Yr3 -0.02282 -0.01849 -0.00433 
Yr4 -0.00807 -0.03254 0.02447 2.36 ** 
Yr5 -0.01087 -0.03698 0.02611 1.99 ** 
Pane B: 5 days 
BM Value Glamour Difference t-statistics 
V-G 
Yr1 0.00088 -0.01391 0.01479 0.837 
Yr2 0.00591 -0.01610 0.02201 0.876 
Yr3 -0.01813 -0.01658 -0.00155 
Yr4 -0.00980 -0.02383 0.01403 1.033 
Yr5 -0.01425 -0.03052 0.01626 1.113 
Panel C: 7 days 
BM Value Glamour Difference t-statistics 
V-G 
Yr1 0.02258 -0.00643 0.02901 1.450 * 
Yr2 0.02539 -0.01959 0.04497 1.584 * 
Yr3 -0.01344 -0.01361 0.00017 0.495 
Yr4 0.00228 -0.02075 0.02303 1.860 * 
Yr5 0.00197 -0.02299 0.02496 1.895 * 
Panel D: 9 days 
M Value Glamour Difference t-statistics 
V-G 
Yr1 0.03930 -0.00213 0.04143 1.796 ** 
Yr2 0.03255 -0.02139 0.05394 1.812 ** 
Yr3 -0.00582 -0.01282 0.00700 0.333 
Yr4 0.01103 -0.01990 0.03093 1.832 * 
Yr5 0.00616 -0.01662 0.02278 1.824 * 
Panel E: 11 days 
BM Value Glamour Difference t-statistics 
V-G 
Yr1 0.05272 -0.00360 0.05632 2.232 ** 
Yr2 0.06392 -0.01915 0.08308 2.656 ** 
Yr3 0.01360 -0.00916 0.02276 1.412 * 
Yr4 0.02369 -0.01334 0.03703 1.981 ** 
Yr5 0.02456 -0.00920 0.03376 2.261 ** 
** significant at 5% error level 
* significant at 10% error level 
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Table 9 
3, 5, 7, 9 and 11 Days Earnings Announcement Returns on Glamour and Value 
Portfolios Classified by E/P Ratio 
Panel A: 3 days 
EP Value Glamour Mean difference t-statistics 
V-G 
Yr1 -0.01848 -0.00532 -0.01316 
Yr2 -0.01852 -0.01847 -0.00005 
Yr3 -0.01163 -0.02316 0.01153 1.559 * 
Yr4 -0.00512 -0.01072 0.00560 0.481 
Yr5 -0.02549 -0.02220 -0.00329 
Panel B: 5 days 
EP Value Glamour Mean difference t-statistics 
V-G 
Yr1 -0.00617 -0.01004 0.00387 0.243 
Yr2 -0.01208 -0.03125 0.01918 1.825 ** 
Yr3 -0.01373 -0.01392 0.00019 0.017 
Yr4 -0.00738 -0.01550 0.00812 0.440 
Yr5 -0.02465 -0.01808 -0.00657 
Panel C: 7 days 
EP Value Glamour Mean difference t-statistics 
V-G 
Yr1 0.00027 -0.00527 0.00554 0.310 
Yr2 -0.00153 -0.01413 0.01260 1.435 * 
Yr3 -0.01150 -0.01282 0.00132 0.083 
Yr4 -0.00060 -0.01492 0.01432 0.649 
Yr5 -0.02075 -0.00973 -0.01102 
Panel D: 9 days 
EP Value Glamour Mean difference t-statistics 
V-G 
Yr1 0.02239 0.00303 0.01936 1.410 * 
Yr2 0.01518 -0.01999 0.03517 1.999 ** 
Yr3 0.00291 -0.00163 0.00455 0.291 
Yr4 0.00952 -0.01446 0.02398 0.971 
Yr5 -0.02165 -0.00724 -0.01440 
Panel E: 11 days 
EP Value Glamour Mean difference t-statistics 
V-G 
Yr1 0.02821 0.01114 0.01707 1.379 * 
Yr2 0.02249 -0.00708 0.02957 1.384 * 
Yr3 0.00560 0.00348 0.00212 0.141 
Yr4 0.01620 0.00190 0.01430 0.593 
Yr5 0.00074 -0.00059 0.00134 0.085 
** significant at 5% error level 
* significant at 10% error level 
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Table 10 
Fundamental Ratios, Prior and Post Returns of Glamour and Value 
Portfolios Classified by B/M and E/P Ratios, 1986-1993 
Panel A: B/M 
Glamour Value G-V 
1. Fundamental variables 
B/M 0.1504 3.5889 -
E/P 0.0337 0.1021 -
2. Prior returns 
AGR(-3,0) 0.4143 0.1091 0.3052 
3. Post returns 
AGR(0,3) 0.1463 0.4315 -0.2852 
Panel B: E/P 
Glamour Value G-V — 
1. Fundamental variables 
B/M 0.5988 1.7602 -
E/P 0.0094 0.2984 -
2. Prior returns 
AGR(-3,0) 0.3709 0.2355 0.1353 
3. Post returns 
AGR(0,3) 0.2271 0.3817 -0.1546 
Remark: 
AGR refers to annualized geometric buy and hold return of a portfolio over 3 years. 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix A. 1 lists company names and industry codes of value and glamour 
stocks formed each year according to B/M ratio from 1986 to 1997. Appendix A.2 
reports the company names and industry codes of value and glamour stocks sorted by 
E/P ratio from 1986 to 1997. Industry code contains seven numbers from 1 to 7, 
corresponding with different types of industry. 








. •• • 
A.1 Company Name and Industry Code of Value and Glamour Stocks 
Classified by B/M Ratio from 1986 to 1997 
B/M Portfolios Formed in 1986 
No. Company Name 
Value Stocks 
Industry Code 
1 FAR EAST HOTELS & ENTERTAINMENT LTD. 6 
2 OXFORD PROPERTIES & FINANCE LTD. 3 
3 WING ON INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
4 CHINA RESOURCES ENTERPRISE, LTD. 3 
5 ESSENTIAL ENTERPRISES CO. LTD. 4 
6 BUILDMORE INTERNATIONAL LTD. 3 
7 KONG SUN HOLDINGS L TO 4 
8 CHINA UNITED HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
9 PIONEER INDUSTRIES INTERNATIONAL (HOLDINGS) LTD. 4 
10 HUEY TAl INTERNATIONAL LTD. 3 
11 CHUANG'S CHINA INVESTMENTS LTD. 5 
12 BERJAYA HOLDINGS (HK) LTD. 3 
13 MIN XIN HOLDINGS LTD. 1 
14 CHINTEX OIL AND GAS CO., LTD. 7 
15 HONG KONG FERRY (HOLDINGS) CO., LTD. 2 
16 GUOCO GROUP LTD. 1 
17 KWONG SANG HONG INTERNATIONAL LTD. 3 
18 HONG KONG TELEPHONE CO., LTD. 2 
Glamour Stocks 
1 SHENYIN WANGUO (H.K.) LTD. 1 
2 HONGKONG INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL BANK LTD. 1 
3 PO WING KWAN INTERNATIONAL (HOLDING) LTD 3 
4 SEN HONG RESURCES HOLDINGS L TD 7 
5 LlPPO L TO. 4 
6 UNION BANK OF HONG KONG LTD. 1 
7 HONGKONG AND SHANGHAI HOTELS, LTD., THE 6 
8 CROSS-HARBOUR TUNNEL CO., LTD., THE 2 
9 LlPPO CHINA RESOURCES L TD 3 
10 TSIM SHA TSUI PROPERTIES LTD. 3 
11 TVE (HOLDINGS) LTD. 4 
12 FURAMA HOTEL ENTERPRISES LTD. 6 
13 HONG KONG AIRCRAFT ENGINEERING CO., LTD. 5 
14 SINGAPORE HONG KONG PROPERTIES INVESTMENT L TO. 4 
15 UNITED OVERSEAS BANK LTD. 1 
16 MELBOURNE ENTERPRISES LTD. 3 
17 HONG KONG & CHINA GAS CO., LTD. 2 
18 HONG FOK CORPORATION LTD. 4 
83 
B/M Portfolios Formed in 1992 (Con't) 
No. Company Name Industry Code 
Value Stocks 
1 REGAL HOTELS INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 6 
2 KECK SENG INVESTMENTS (HONG KONG) LTD. 3 
3 TAK WING INVESTMENT (HOLDINGS) LTD. 3 
4 EMPEROR (CHINA CONCEPT) INVESTMENTS LTD. 3 
5 CHINA RESOURCES ENTERPRISE, LTD. 3 
6 DYNAMIC HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
7 HONGKONG FAR EAST CREDIT & PROPERTIES LTD. 1 
8 KONG TAI INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS CO., LTD. 3 
9 ASSOCIATED INTERNATIONAL HOTELS LTD. 6 
10 WING ON INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
11 FIRST SHANGHAI INVESTMENTS LTD. 1 
12 PIONEER INDUSTRIES INTERNATIONAL (HOLDINGS) LTD. 4 
13 CONTINENTAL MARINER INVESTMENT CO., LTD. 7 
14 LION ASIA LTD. 3 
15 MIN XIN HOLDINGS LTD. 1 
16 CHUANG'S CHINA INVESTMENTS LTD. 5 
17 GUOCO GROUP LTD. 1 
18 TIAN TECK LAND LTD. 6 
19 TOP GLORY INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
Glamour Stocks 
1 PO WING KWAN INTERNATIONAL (HOLDING) LTD 3 
2 LIPPO CHINA RESOURCES LTD 3 
3 HONG KONG AIRCRAFT ENGINEERING CO., LTD. 5 
4 CATHAY PACIFIC AIRWAYS LTD. 4 
5 TVE (HOLDINGS) LTD. 4 
6 CROSS-HARBOUR TUNNEL CO., LTD., THE 2 
7 HONGKONG AND SHANGHAI HOTELS, LTD., THE 6 
8 ASIA ORIENT HOLDINGS LTD. 1 
9 CAFE DE CORAL HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
10 GOODWILL INVESTMENT (HOLDINGS) LTD. 1 
11 JOHNSON ELECTRIC HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
12 DAN FORM HOLDINGS CO LTD 3 
13 GRAND ORIENT HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
14 LAI SUN HOTELS INT'L LTD. 6 
15 HERALD HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
16 KOWLOON MOTOR BUS CO HOLDINGS LTD 2 
17 SINGAPORE HONG KONG PROPERTIES INVESTMENT LTD. 4 
18 HARBOUR CENTRE DEVELOPMENT LTD. 6 
19 LAI SUN DEVELOPMENT CO., LTD. 3 
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B/M Portfolios Formed in 1988 
No. Company Name Industry Code 
Value Stocks 
1 LION ASIA LTD. 3 
2 TIAN AN CHINA INVESTMENTS CO., LTD. 3 
3 USI HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
4 L1PPO LTD. 4 
5 PALlBURG INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
6 DAN FORM HOLDINGS CO L TD 3 
7 TOP GLORY INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
8 REGAL HOTELS INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 6 
9 KECK SENG INVESTMENTS (HONG KONG) LTD. 3 
10 B+B ASIA LTD. 5 
11 FIRST SHANGHAI INVESTMENTS LTD. 1 
12 WING ON INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
13 PIONEER INDUSTRIES INTERNATIONAL (HOLDINGS) LTD. 4 
14 TAl SANG LAND DEVELOPMENT LTD. 3 
15 TIAN TECK LAND LTD. 6 
16 SHENYIN WANGUO (H.K.) LTD. 1 
17 MILLENNIUM GROUP LTD. 4 
18 CHINESE ESTATES HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
19 MIN XIN HOLDINGS LTD. 1 
20 CENTURY CITY INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
Glamour Stocks 
1 L1PPO CHINA RESOURCES L TD 3 
2 CABLE AND WIRELESS PLC 2 
3 ORIENTAL PRESS GROUP LTD. 4 
4 FAI INSURANCES LTD. 1 
5 SEN HONG RESURCES HOLDINGS L TD 7 
6 FIRST PACIFIC BANCSHARES HOLDINGS LTD. 2 
7 TVE (HOLDINGS) LTD. 4 
8 TERN PROPERTIES CO., LTD. 3 
9 CROSS-HARBOUR TUNNEL CO., LTD., THE 2 
10 QPL INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
11 CROCODILE GARMENTS LTD. 4 
12 MULTI-ASIA INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS L TD 5 
13 JOHNSON ELECTRIC HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
14 LAM SOON (HONG KONG) LTD. 5 
15 CHUANG'S CHINA INVESTMENTS LTD. 5 
16 SHUN TAK HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
17 HAW PAR CORPORATION LTD. 4 
18 HARBOUR CENTRE DEVELOPMENT LTD. 6 
19 ASIA ORIENT HOLDINGS LTD. 1 
20 CUL TURECOM HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
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B/M Portfolios Formed in 1989 
No. Company Name Industry Code 
Value Stocks 
1 MANDARIN ORIENTAL INTERNATIONAL LTD. 6 
2 LlPPO LTD. 4 
3 UNION BANK OF HONG KONG LTD. 1 
4 PALlBURG INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
5 TSIM SHA TSUI PROPERTIES LTD. 3 
6 SHUN HO RESOURCES HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
7 POL Y INVESTMENTS HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
8 HONGKONG LAND HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
9 GUANGDONG INVESTMENT LTD. 4 
10 SHUN HO CONSTRUCTION (HOLDINGS) LTD. 3 
11 WINFOONG INTERNATIONAL LTD. 3 
12 ASEAN RESOURCES HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
13 DYNAMIC HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
14 REGAL HOTELS INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 6 
15 GOODWILL INVESTMENT (HOLDINGS) LTD. 1 
16 MAGNIFICENT ESTATES LTD. 3 
17 TAl SANG LAND DEVELOPMENT LTD. 3 
18 DC FINANCE (HOLDINGS) LTD. 3 
19 SHENYIN WANGUO (H.K.) LTD. 1 
20 CHINA RESOURCES ENTERPRISE, LTD. 3 
21 TIAN TECK LAND LTD. 6 
22 CHINTEX OIL AND GAS CO., LTD. 7 
23 CENTURY CITY INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
24 CHINA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION L TO 4 
Glamour Stocks 
1 PARAMOUNT PUBLISHING GROUP LTD. 5 
2 CHEVALIER (OA) INTERNATIONAL LTD. 4 
3 CABLE AND WIRELESS PLC 2 
4 SHENZHEN INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
5 TELEVISION BROADCASTS LTD. 4 
6 FAI INSURANCES LTD. 1 
7 SEN HONG RESURCES HOLDINGS L TO 7 
8 SHOUGANG CONCORD TECHNOLOGY HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
9 CROSS-HARBOUR TUNNEL CO., LTD., THE 2 
10 PUDONG DEVELOPMENT HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
11 HONG KONG TELECOMMUNICATIONS LTD. 2 
12 LAM SOON (HONG KONG) LTD. 5 
13 ASIA ORIENT HOLDINGS LTD. 1 
14 HONGKONG AND SHANGHAI HOTELS, LTD. 6 
15 YAOHAN HONGKONG CORPORATION LTD. 4 
16 QPL INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
17 MANSION HOUSE GROUP LTD. 1 
18 CHINA & EASTERN INVESTMENT CO., LTD. 1 
19 HONG KONG AIRCRAFT ENGINEERING CO., LTD. 5 
20 HONG KONG & CHINA GAS CO., L TO., THE 2 
21 HAW PAR CORPORATION LTD. 4 
22 UNITED OVERSEAS BANK LTD. 1 
23 CATHAY PACIFIC AIRWAYS LTD. 4 
24 CROCODILE GARMENTS LTD. 4 
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B/M Portfolios Formed in 1990 
No. Company Name Industry Code 
Value Stocks 
1 HANG LUNG DEVELOPMENT CO., LTD. 3 
2 ALLIED GROUP LTD. 4 
3 TAK WING INVESTMENT (HOLDINGS) LTD. 3 
4 SHUN HO RESOURCES HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
5 ASSOCIATED INTERNATIONAL HOTELS LTD. 6 
6 MIN XIN HOLDINGS LTD. 1 
7 LlPPO CHINA RESOURCES LTD 3 
8 DYNAMIC HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
9 DC FINANCE (HOLDINGS) LTD. 3 
10 CHUANG'S CONSORTIUM INTERNATIONAL LTD. 4 
11 FAR EAST HOLDINGS INTERNATIONAL LTD. 4 
12 REGAL HOTELS INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 6 
13 CHINESE ESTATES HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
14 TSIM SHA TSUI PROPERTIES LTD. 3 
15 MINGL Y CORPORATION LTD., THE 3 
16 CHINA AEROSPACE INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
17 WHEELOCK AND CO., LTD. 4 
18 TOP GLORY INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
19 CHEUK NANG PROPERTIES (HOLDINGS) LTD. 3 
20 CHINTEX OIL AND GAS CO., LTD. 7 
21 SUN MAN TAl HLODINGS CO L TO 5 
22 SHENYIN WANGUO (H.K.) LTD. 1 
23 CENTURY CITY INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
24 TIAN TECK LAND LTD. 6 
25 POL Y INVESTMENTS HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
26 CHINA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION L TO 4 
Glamour Stocks 
1 CABLE AND WIRELESS PLC 2 
2 HING KONG HOLDINGS L TO 5 
3 DAIRY FARM INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
4 SEN HONG RESURCES HOLDINGS L TO 7 
5 FAI INSURANCES LTD. 1 
6 JF INDONESIA FUND INC. 1 
7 C. P. POKPHAND CO., LTD. 4 
8 HONG KONG DAILY NEWS HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
9 MELBOURNE ENTERPRISES LTD. 3 
10 TELEVISION BROADCASTS LTD. 4 
11 THAI-ASIA FUND L TO., THE 1 
12 EMPEROR (CHINA CONCEPT) INVESTMENTS LTD. 3 
13 CROSS-HARBOUR TUNNEL CO., L TO. , THE 2 
14 DAIDO CONCRETE (H.K.) LTD. 5 
15 HONG KONG TELECOMMUNICATIONS LTD. 2 
16 CHINA & EASTERN INVESTMENT CO. , LTD. 1 
17 JARDINE MATHESON HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
18 HONG KONG AIRCRAFT ENGINEERING CO., LTD. 5 
19 UNITED OVERSEAS BANK LTD. 1 
20 ASIA ORIENT HOLDINGS LTD. 1 
21 SAFETY GODOWN CO., LTD. 4 
22 HONG KONG & CHINA GAS CO., L TO., THE 2 
23 CONTINENTAL MARINER INVESTMENT CO., LTD. 7 
24 GOLDTRON HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
25 CAFE DE CORAL HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
26 HAW PAR CORPORATION LTD. 4 
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B/M Portfolios Formed in 1991 
No. Company Name Industry Code 
Value Stocks 
1 CHUANG'S CONSORTIUM INTERNATIONAL LTD. 4 
2 DC FINANCE (HOLDINGS) LTD. 3 
3 LIPPO CHINA RESOURCES LTD 3 
4 SINO LAND CO., LTD. 3 
5 CHINA AEROSPACE INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
6 CHINA UNITED HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
7 SHUN HO RESOURCES HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
8 HANG LUNG DEVELOPMENT CO., LTD. 3 
9 NEW WORLD DEVELOPMENT CO., LTD. 3 
10 TIAN TECK LAND LTD. 6 
11 TAI SANG LAND DEVELOPMENT LTD. 3 
12 CHINA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION LTD 4 
13 CDL HOTELS INTERNATIONAL LTD. 6 
14 F A R E A S T CONSORTIUM INTERNATIONAL LTD. 3 
15 CHINTEX OIL AND GAS CO., LTD. 7 
16 CHEUK NANG PROPERTIES (HOLDINGS) LTD. 3 
17 ASSOCIATED INTERNATIONAL HOTELS LTD. 6 
18 CENTURY CITY INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
19 MINGLY CORPORATION LTD., THE 3 
20 TSIM SHA TSUI PROPERTES LTD. 3 
21 LAI SUN GARMENT (INTERNATIONAL) LTD. 5 
22 CHINESE ESTATES HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
23 PAUL Y. PROPERTIES GROUP LTD 4 
24 GOODWILL INVESTMENT (HOLDINGS) LTD. 1 
25 ASIA STANDARD INTERNATIONAL GROUP LTD. 3 
Glamour Stocks 
1 MELCO INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT LTD. 4 
2 CABLE AND WIRELESS PLC 2 
3 FAI INSURANCES LTD. 1 
4 C. P. POKPHAND CO., LTD. 4 
5 JARDINE INTERNATIONAL MOTOR HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
6 SINCERE CO., LTD., THE 4 
7 SEN HONG RESURCES HOLDINGS LTD 7 
8 HONG KONG TELECOMMUNICATIONS LTD. 2 
9 CROSS-HARBOUR TUNNEL CO.. LTD., THE 2 
10 JF INDONESIA FUND INC. 1 
11 SHOUGANG CONCORD TECHNOLOGY HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
12 HONG KONG & CHINA GAS CO., LTD., THE 2 
13 ASIA ORIENT HOLDINGS LTD. 1 
14 GUOCO GROUP LTD. 1 
15 TELEVISION BROADCASTS LTD. 4 
16 CHINA & EASTERN INVESTMENT CO., LTD. 1 
17 HAW PAR CORPORATION LTD. 4 
18 G-PROP (HOLDINGS) LTD 5 
19 HING KONG HOLDINGS LTD 5 
20 SAFETY GODOWN CO., LTD. 4 
21 UNIVERSAL APPLIANCES LTD. 5 
22 HONG KONG AIRCRAFT ENGINEERING CO., LTD. 5 
23 HONG KONG DAILY NEWS HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
24 MUl HONG KONG LTD. 4 
25 CAPETRONIC INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
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B/M Portfolios Formed in 1992 
No. Company Name Industry Code 
Value Stocks 
1 SHOUGANG CONCORD GRAND (GROUP) LTD. 3 
2 BEST WIDE GROUP LTD. 5 
3 WING ON INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
4 CDL HOTELS INTERNATIONAL LTD. 6 
5 MAGNIFICENT ESTATES LTD. 3 
6 TAl SANG LAND DEVELOPMENT LTD. 3 
7 WINFOONG INTERNATIONAL LTD. 3 
8 REGAL HOTELS INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 6 
9 ASSOCIATED INTERNATIONAL HOTELS LTD. 6 
10 SHUN HO RESOURCES HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
11 LlPPO CHINA RESOURCES L TD 3 
12 SEA HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
13 TSIM SHA TSUI PROPERTIES LTD. 3 
14 FAR EAST HOLDINGS INTERNATIONAL LTD. 4 
15 FAR EAST CONSORTIUM INTERNATIONAL LTD. 3 
16 POKFULAM DEVELOPMENT CO., LTD. 3 
17 TOP GLORY INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
18 CHINA AEROSPACE INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
19 GOODWILL INVESTMENT (HOLDINGS) LTD. 1 
20 FAIRYOUNG HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
21 CHINTEX OIL AND GAS CO., LTD. 7 
22 CHINESE ESTATES HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
23 LAI SUN HOTELS INT'L LTD. 6 
24 LAI SUN GARMENT (INTERNATIONAL) LTD. 5 
25 KECK SENG INVESTMENTS (HONG KONG) LTD. 3 
26 CHINA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION L TD 4 
27 CENTURY CITY INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
28 CHUANG'S CHINA INVESTMENTS LTD. 5 
29 TIAN TECK LAND LTD. 6 
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B/M Portfolios Formed in 1992 (Con't) 
No. Company Name Industry Code 
Glamour Stocks 
1 JARDINE INTERNATIONAL MOTOR HOLDINGS LTD 4 
2 CABLE AND WIRELESS PLC 2 
3 PENINSULAR AND ORIENTAL STEAM NAVIGATION 4 
4 YAU LEE HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
5 UDL HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
6 FAI INSURANCES LTD. 1 
7 C. P. POKPHAND CO., LTD. 4 
8 HSBC HOLDINGS PLC 1 
9 ABC COMMUNICATIONS (HOLDINGS) LTD. 4 
10 GREAT WALL ELECTRONIC INTERNATIONAL LTD. 5 
11 GUOCO GROUP LTD. 1 
12 HONG KONG TELECOMMUNICATIONS LTD. 2 
13 K. WAH CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS LTD 5 
14 HANNY HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
15 TAK SING ALLIANCE HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
16 JF INDONESIA FUND INC. 1 
17 CHEUNG WAH DEVELOPMENT CO., LTD. 5 
18 TOP FORM INTERNATIONAL LTD. 5 
19 CROSS-HARBOUR TUNNEL CO., LTD., THE 2 
20 LEEFUNG-ASCO PRINTERS HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
21 CHINA & EASTERN INVESTMENT CO., LTD. 1 
22 INNOVATIVE INTERNATIONAL (HOLDINGS) LTD. 5 
23 S. MEGGA INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
24 YIP'S HANG CHEUNG (HOLDINGS) LTD. 5 
25 SEN HONG RESURCES HOLDINGS LTD 7 
26 STYLAND HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
27 G-PROP (HOLDINGS) LTD 5 
28 SIME DARBY HONG KONG LTD. 4 
29 HONG KONG & CHINA GAS CO., LTD. 2 
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B/M Portfolios Formed in 1993 
No. Company Name Industry Code 
Value Stocks 
1 GRAND ORIENT HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
2 YOSHIYA INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, LTD. 3 
3 ASSOCIATED INTERNATIONAL HOTELS LTD. 6 
4 CHUANG'S CONSORTIUM INTERNATIONAL LTD. 4 
5 CHEVALIER INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
6 TAl SANG LAND DEVELOPMENT LTD. 3 
7 SOUTHEAST ASIA PROPERTIES & FINANCE LTD. 4 
8 ONFEM HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
9 CENTURY CITY INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
10 CHEUK NANG PROPERTIES (HOLDINGS) LTD. 3 
11 PUDONG DEVELOPMENT HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
12 EMPEROR INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
13 FAR EAST HOTELS & ENTERTAINMENT LTD. 6 
14 SINGAPORE HONG KONG PROPERTIES INVESTMENT LTD. 4 
15 WING ON INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
16 REGAL HOTELS INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 6 
17 WINFOONG INTERNATIONAL LTD. 3 
18 FAR EAST CONSORTIUM INTERNATIONAL LTD. 3 
19 TAK WING INVESTMENT (HOLDINGS) LTD. 3 
20 TSIM SHA TSUI PROPERTIES LTD. 3 
21 RIVERA (HOLDINGS) LTD. 3 
22 SEAPOWER INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
23 GOODWILL INVESTMENT (HOLDINGS) LTD. 1 
24 ALLIED GROUP LTD. 4 
25 FAR EAST HOLDINGS INTERNATIONAL LTD. 4 
26 MINGL Y CORPORATION LTD., THE 3 
27 CHINTEX OIL AND GAS CO., LTD. 7 
28 SEA HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
29 TOP GLORY INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
30 POKFULAM DEVELOPMENT CO., LTD. 3 
31 LAI SUN DEVELOPMENT CO., LTD. 3 
32 LAI SUN GARMENT (INTERNATIONAL) LTD. 5 
33 CHINA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION L TD 4 
34 LAI SUN HOTELS INT'L LTD. 6 
35 TIAN TECK LAND LTD. 6 
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B/M Portfolios Formed in 1992 (Con't) 
No. Company Name Industry Code 
Glamour Stocks 
1 C. P. POKPHAND CO., LTD. 4 
2 HONGKONG FROZEN FOOD HOLDINGS LTD 4 
3 NGAI UK INDUSTRIAL HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
4 JARDINE INTERNATIONAL MOTOR HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
5 PENINSULAR AND ORIENTAL STEAM NAVIGATION CO. 4 
6 FAI INSURANCES LTD. 1 
7 CHAMPION TECHNOLOGY HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
8 ORIENT TELECOM & TECHNOLOGY HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
9 PAM & FRANK INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
10 VTECH HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
11 NORTHERN INT'L HOLDINGS LTD 5 
12 TEXWINCA HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
13 MAGNUM INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
14 SEN HONG RESURCES HOLDINGS LTD 7 
15 ALLAN INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
16 FAIRWOOD HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
17 GUOCO GROUP LTD. 1 
18 HSBC HOLDINGS PLC 1 
19 HONG KONG TELECOMMUNICATIONS LTD. 2 
20 SHUN CHEONG HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
21 LAMEX HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
22 NATIONAL MUTUAL ASIA LTD. 1 
23 CHUNG TAI PRINTING HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
24 LE SAUNDA HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
25 JARDINE MATHESON HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
26 CROSS-HARBOUR TUNNEL CO., LTD., THE 2 
27 PERFECTECH INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
28 CHINA ASSETS (HOLDINGS) LTD. 1 
29 GIORDANO INTERNATIONAL LTD. 4 
30 TELEVISION BROADCASTS LTD. 4 
31 LEUNG KEE HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
32 HONG KONG & CHINA GAS CO., LTD., THE 2 
33 SHOUGANG CONCORD INTL ENTERPRISES CO., LTD. 4 
34 WAI KEE HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
35 FUNG CHEUNG KEE HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
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B/M Portfolios Formed in 1992 (Con't) 
No. Company Name Industry Code 
Value Stocks 
1 GREAT CHINA HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
2 ASIA STANDARD INTERNATIONAL GROUP LTD. 3 
3 GUANGZHOU SHIPYARD INT'L CO., LTD. - H SHARES 5 
4 TAI SANG LAND DEVELOPMENT LTD. 3 
5 MAANSHAN IRON & STEEL CO., LTD. - H SHARES 5 
6 OCEAN-LAND GROUP LTD 4 
7 CHUANG'S CONSORTIUM INTERNATIONAL LTD. 4 
8 SHANGHAI PETROCHEMICAL CO., LTD. - H SHARES 5 
9 CHINA FOODS HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
10 HUEY TAI INTERNATIONAL LTD. 3 
11 KUNMING MACHINE TOOL CO., LTD. - H SHARES 5 
12 CHEVAUER INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
13 YU MING INVESTMENTS LTD 1 
14 FAR EAST CONSORTIUM INTERNATIONAL LTD. 3 
15 SINGAPORE HONG KONG PROPERTIES INVESTMENT LTD. 4 
16 HOP HING HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
17 FUJIAN GROUP LTD 3 
18 TAK WING INVESTMENT (HOLDINGS) LTD. 3 
19 CHEUK NANG PROPERTIES (HOLDINGS) LTD. 3 
20 WING ON COMPANY INTERNATIONAL LTD. 4 
21 DAN FORM HOLDINGS CO LTD 3 
22 CHINA INVESTMENTS HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
23 USI HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
24 YOSHIYA INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, LTD. 3 
25 KADER HOLDINGS CO., LTD. 5 
26 SEAPOWER INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
27 POKFULAM DEVELOPMENT CO., LTD. 3 
28 SHUN HO RESOURCES HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
29 REGAL HOTELS INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 6 
30 LIPPO CHINA RESOURCES LTD 3 
31 SEA HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
32 PAUL Y. PROPERTIES GROUP LTD 4 
33 LIPPO LTD. 4 
34 WINFOONG INTERNATIONAL LTD. 3 
35 LAI SUN GARMENT (INTERNATIONAL) LTD. 5 
36 WING ON INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
37 LAI SUN HOTELS INT'L LTD. 6 
38 CHINTEX OIL AND GAS CO., LTD. 7 
39 TIAN TECK LAND LTD. 6 
40 MANDARIN RESOURCES CORPORATION LTD. 4 
41 CENTURY CITY INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
93 
B/M Portfolios Formed in 1994 (Con't) 
No. Company Name Industry Code 
Glamour Stocks 
1 SEN HONG RESURCES HOLDINGS L TD 7 
2 WAH KWONG SHIPPING HOLDINGS LTD. 7 
3 WORLD HOUSEWARE (HOLDINGS) LTD. 5 
4 SIU-FUNG CERAMICS HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
5 CABLE AND WIRELESS PLC 2 
6 JARDINE INTERNATIONAL MOTOR HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
7 DAH HWA INTERNATIONAL (HOLDINGS) LTD. 4 
8 ESPRIT HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
9 C. P. POKPHAND CO., LTD. 4 
10 GUOCO GROUP LTD. 1 
11 HSBC HOLDINGS PLC 1 
12 LEI SHING HONG LTD. 4 
13 KINGBOARD CHEMICAL HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
14 VTECH HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
15 MEI AH ENTERTAINMENT GROUP LTD. 4 
16 TELEVISION BROADCASTS LTD. 4 
17 COMPANION BUILDING MATERIAL (HOLDINGS) LTD. 4 
18 ISLAND DYEING AND PRINTING CO., LTD. 3 
19 HONG KONG TELECOMMUNICATIONS LTD. 2 
20 FOUR SEAS MERCANTILE HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
21 YEEBO (INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS) LTD. 5 
22 PENINSULAR AND ORIENTAL STEAM NAVIGATION CO. 4 
23 MOULlN INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
24 LAMEX HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
25 CNPC (HONG KONG) LTD. 7 
26 SHANGHAI INTL SHANGHAI GROWTH INVESTMENT LTD. 1 
27 VINCENT INTERTRANS (HOLDINGS) LTD. 4 
28 NATIONAL MUTUAL ASIA LTD. 1 
29 ORIENTAL PRESS GROUP LTD. 4 
30 SIME DARBY HONG KONG LTD. 4 
31 CHAMPION TECHNOLOGY HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
32 KOWLOON MOTOR BUS CO HOLDINGS L TD 2 
33 GOLDLlON HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
34 RIGHTEOUS (HOLDINGS) LTD. 4 
35 TEXWINCA HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
36 CHINA MERCHANTS CHINA DIRECT INVESTMENTS LTD. 1 
37 KTP HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
38 WAI KEE HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
39 SING TAO HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
40 ABC COMMUNICATIONS (HOLDINGS) LTD. 4 
41 JF INDONESIA FUND INC. 1 
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B/M Portfolios Formed in1995 
No. Company Name Industry Code 
Value Stocks 
1 KADER HOLDINGS CO., LTD. 5 
2 RJP ELECTRONICS LTD. 5 
3 ONFEM HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
4 FORTUNA INT'L HOLDINGS L TO 5 
5 GUANGZHOU SHIPYARD INT'L CO., LTD. - H SHARES 5 
6 CHINA RESOURCES ENTERPRISE, LTD. 3 
7 CHINTEX OIL AND GAS CO., LTD. 7 
8 USI HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
9 BURLlNGAME INTERNATIONAL CO., LTD. 3 
10 MILLENNIUM GROUP LTD. 4 
11 FAR EAST HOLDINGS INTERNATIONAL LTD. 4 
12 DYNAMIC HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
13 PLOTIO HOLDINGS L TO 3 
14 PRESTIGE PROPERTIES HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
15 MULTI-ASIA INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD 5 
16 POKFULAM DEVELOPMENT CO., LTD. 3 
17 PO WING KWAN INTERNATIONAL (HOLDING) LTD 3 
18 ZHENHAI REFINING & CHEMICAL CO., LTD. - H SHARES 5 
19 YOSHIYA INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, LTD. 3 
20 LAI SUN HOTELS INT'L LTD. 6 
21 BEIREN PRINTING MACHINERY HOLDINGS L TD.- H SHARES 5 
22 MAANSHAN IRON & STEEL CO., LTD. - H SHARES 5 
23 MAGNIFICENT ESTATES LTD. 3 
24 CONTINENTAL HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
25 TSIM SHA TSUI PROPERTIES LTD. 3 
26 FAR EAST CONSORTIUM INTERNATIONAL LTD. 3 
27 CHUANG'S CONSORTIUM INTERNATIONAL LTD. 4 
28 WING ON INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
29 LlPPO LTD. 4 
30 KUNMING MACHINE TOOL CO., LTD. - H SHARES 5 
31 CHINA INVESTMENTS HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
32 HUEY TAl INTERNATIONAL LTD. 3 
33 EMPEROR (CHINA CONCEPT) INVESTMENTS LTD. 3 
34 WINFOONG INTERNATIONAL LTD. 3 
35 MANDARIN RESOURCES CORPORATION LTD. 4 
36 SHUN HO RESOURCES HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
37 TIAN TECK LAND LTD. 6 
38 TIANJIN BOHAI CHEM. IND. (GROUP) CO., L TD.-H SHARES 5 
39 MINGLY CORPORATION LTD. 3 
40 SHUN HO CONSTRUCTION (HOLDINGS) LTD. 3 
41 CENTURY CITY INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
42 LAI SUN GARMENT (INTERNATIONAL) LTD. 5 
43 ASIA ORIENT HOLDINGS LTD. 1 
44 PAUL Y. PROPERTIES GROUP L TO 4 
45 CHUANG'S CHINA INVESTMENTS LTD. 5 
46 EMPEROR INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
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B/M Portfolios Formed in1995 
No. Company Name Industry Code 
Glamour Stocks 
GOODWILL INVESTMENT (HOLDINGS) LTD. 1 
2 WAH KWONG SHIPPING HOLDINGS LTD. 7 
3 SEN HONG RESURCES HOLDINGS L TO 7 
4 VTECH HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
5 PENINSULAR AND ORIENTAL STEAM NAVIGATION CO. 4 
6 FAI INSURANCES LTD. 1 
7 JARDINE INTERNATIONAL MOTOR HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
8 HSBC HOLDINGS PLC 1 
9 COSCO PACIFIC LTD. 4 
10 TELEVISION BROADCASTS LTD. 4 
11 C. P. POKPHAND CO., LTD. 4 
12 HONG KONG TELECOMMUNICATIONS LTD. 2 
13 ISLAND DYEING AND PRINTING CO., LTD. 3 
14 GUOCO GROUP LTD. 1 
15 CHINA-HONGKONG PHOTO PRODUCTS HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
16 PACIFIC ANDES INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
17 JF INDONESIA FUND INC. 1 
18 CHINA MERCHANTS CHINA DIRECT INVESTMENTS LTD. 1 
19 ITC CORPORATION L TO 5 
20 ESPRIT HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
21 HSBC CHINA FUND LTD. 1 
22 CHUNG HWA DEVELOPMENT HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
23 LEI SHING HONG LTD. 4 
24 THAI-ASIA FUND LTD., THE 1 
25 DAH HWA INTERNATIONAL (HOLDINGS) LTD. 4 
26 GIORDANO INTERNATIONAL LTD. 4 
27 LOGIC INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
28 GOLDEN HARVEST ENTERTAINMENT (HOLDINGS) LTD. 4 
29 VARITRONIX INTERNATIONAL LTD. 5 
30 SHANGHAI INTL SHANGHAI GROWTH INVESTMENT LTD. 1 
31 ABC COMMUNICATIONS (HOLDINGS) LTD. 4 
32 SI ME DARBY HONG KONG LTD. 4 
33 ORIENT OVERSEAS (INTERNATIONAL) LTD. 4 
34 TEXWINCA HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
35 KOWLOON MOTOR BUS CO HOLDINGS L TO 2 
36 HAW PAR CORPORATION LTD. 4 
37 LAMEX HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
38 CYBERSONIC TECHNOLOGY L TO 5 
39 MANHATTAN CARD CO., LTD. 1 
40 WING LUNG BANK LTD. 1 
41 FOUR SEAS MERCANTILE HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
42 WORLD HOUSEWARE (HOLDINGS) LTD. 5 
43 CNPC (HONG KONG) LTD. 7 
44 CH EN HSONG HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
45 LI & FUNG LTD. 4 
46 CLP HOLDINGS L TO 2 
96 
B/M Portfolios Formed in 1996 
No. Company Name Industry Code 
Value Stocks 
1 G-PROP (HOLDINGS) L TO 5 
2 CHUANG'S CONSORTIUM INTERNATIONAL LTD. 4 
3 RIVERA (HOLDINGS) LTD. 3 
4 WINFOONG INTERNATIONAL LTD. 3 
5 POKFULAM DEVELOPMENT CO., LTD. 3 
6 JILlN CHEMICAL INDUSTRIAL CO. LTD. - H SHARES 5 
7 FAR EAST CONSORTIUM INTERNATIONAL LTD. 3 
8 CHINA INVESTMENTS HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
9 SINCERE CO., LTD., THE 4 
10 CITY CHIU CHOW (HOLDINGS) LTD. 4 
11 MAGNIFICENT ESTATES LTD. 3 
12 ASIA STANDARD INTERNATIONAL GROUP LTD. 3 
13 NANYANG HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
14 POLY INVESTMENTS HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
15 TIANJIN BOHAI CHEM. IND. (GROUP) CO., LTD.-H SHARES 5 
16 HUEY TAl INTERNATIONAL LTD. 3 
17 FAR EAST HOLDINGS INTERNATIONAL LTD. 4 
18 PRESTIGE PROPERTIES HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
19 LUOYANG GLASS CO., LTD. - H SHARES 5 
20 GUANGZHOU SHIPYARD INT'L CO., LTD. - H SHARES 5 
21 SHUN HO RESOURCES HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
22 RECOR HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
23 PO WING KWAN INTERNATIONAL (HOLDING) L TO 3 
24 LlPPO LTD. 4 
25 NORTHEAST ELECTRICAL T&T MCHNY MFG CO L TD-H SHARES 5 
26 HARBIN POWER EQUIPMENT CO., LTD. - H SHARES 5 
27 CHENGDU TELECOM. CABLE CO., LTD. - H SHARES 5 
28 CONTINENTAL HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
29 SHUN HO CONSTRUCTION (HOLDINGS) LTD. 3 
30 ZHENHAI REFINING & CHEMICAL CO., LTD. - H SHARES 5 
31 EMPEROR (CHINA CONCEPT) INVESTMENTS LTD. 3 
32 GOLDTRON HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
33 CENTURY CITY INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
34 SOUTH SEA DEVELOPMENT CO., LTD. 3 
35 ASIA ORIENT HOLDINGS LTD. 1 
36 BEIREN PRINTING MACHINERY HOLDINGS L TD.- H SHARES 5 
37 EMPEROR INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
38 ASIA COMMERCIAL HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
39 TIAN TECK LAND LTD. 6 
40 LAI SUN HOTELS INT'L LTD. 6 
41 MAANSHAN IRON & STEEL CO., LTD. - H SHARES 5 
42 CONTINENTAL MARINER INVESTMENT CO., LTD. 7 
43 PAUL Y. PROPERTIES GROUP L TD 4 
44 LANE CRAWFORD INTERNATIONAL LTD. 'A' 4 
45 YOSHIYA INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, LTD. 3 
46 CHINA SHIPPING DEVELOPMENT CO L TD - H SHARES 7 
47 LAI SUN GARMENT (INTERNATIONAL) LTD. 5 
48 KUNMING MACHINE TOOL CO., LTD. - H SHARES 5 
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B/M Portfolios Formed in 1992 (Con't) 
No. Company Name Industry Code 
Glamour Stocks 
1 COSCO PACIFIC LTD. 4 
2 CABLE AND WIRELESS PLC 2 
3 DAH HWA INTERNATIONAL (HOLDINGS) LTD. 4 
4 VTECH HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
5 SEN HONG RESURCES HOLDINGS LTD 7 
6 PACIFIC PLYWOOD HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
7 C. P. POKPHAND CO., LTD. 4 
8 PERFECTECH INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
9 HSBC HOLDINGS PLC 1 
10 JARDINE INTERNATIONAL MOTOR HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
11 WAH KWONG SHIPPING HOLDINGS LTD. 7 
12 EASYKNITINTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
13 NGAI LIK INDUSTRIAL HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
14 TELEVISION BROADCASTS LTD. 4 
15 HONG KONG TELECOMMUNICATIONS LTD. 2 
16 LI & FUNG LTD. 4 
17 GUOCO GROUP LTD. 1 
18 FIRST SIGN INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
19 KONG TAI INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS CO., LTD. 3 
20 NATIONAL MUTUAL ASIA LTD. 1 
21 CHINA-HONGKONG PHOTO PRODUCTS HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
22 JF INDONESIA FUND INC. 1 
23 THAI-ASIA FUND LTD., THE 1 
24 PEARL ORIENTAL HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
25 NGAI HING HONG CO., LTD. 5 
26 GIORDANO INTERNATIONAL LTD. 4 
27 CHINA MERCHANTS CHINA DIRECT INVESTMENTS LTD. 1 
28 GOLDLION HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
29 VARITRONIX INTERNATIONAL LTD. 5 
30 MAGICIAN INDUSTRIES (HOLDINGS) LTD. 5 
31 VAN DA SYSTEMS & COMMUNICATIONS HOLDINGS LTD 4 
32 CHAIFA HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
33 SINOCAN HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
34 LB SHING HONG LTD. 4 
35 ORIENT OVERSEAS (INTERNATIONAL) LTD. 4 
36 ESPRIT HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
37 CLP HOLDINGS LTD 2 
38 SIME DARBY HONG KONG LTD. 4 
39 MANHATTAN CARD CO., LTD. 1 
40 FOUR SEAS MERCANTILE HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
41 MOULIN INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
42 YEEBO (INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS) LTD. 5 
43 CHUNG HWA DEVELOPMENT HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
44 KOWLOON MOTOR BUS CO HOLDINGS LTD 2 
45 HONGKONG ELECTRIC HOLDINGS LTD. 2 
46 TERMBRAY INDUSTRIES INTERNATIONAL (HOLDINGS) LTD. 5 
47 NG FUNG HONG LTD. 4 
48 ASM PACIFIC TECHNOLOGY LTD. 5 
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B/M Portfolios Formed in 1997 
No. Company Name Industry Code 
Value Stocks 
TAK WING INVESTMENT (HOLDINGS) LTD. 3 
2 GRANDE HOLDINGS LTD., THE 5 
3 DONGFANG ELECTRICAL MACHINERY CO., LTD. - H SHARES 5 
4 PO WING KWAN INTERNATIONAL (HOLDING) LTD 3 
5 LEEFUNG-ASCO PRINTERS HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
6 TOMEIINTERNATIONAL (HOLDINGS) LTD. 5 
7 HONG KONG TOY CENTRE INTERNATIONAL LTD. 5 
8 CHEUNG WAH DEVELOPMENT CO., LTD. 5 
9 CHINA STAR ENTERTAINMENT LTD. 4 
10 EASY CONCEPTS INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS L TD 4 
11 SEA HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
12 WINFOONG INTERNATIONAL LTD. 3 
13 JINGWEI TEXTILE MACHINERY CO L TD - H SHARES 5 
14 COSMOS MACHINERY ENTERPRISES LTD. 4 
15 PUDONG DEVELOPMENT HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
16 KECK SENG INVESTMENTS (HONG KONG) LTD. 3 
17 ASIA ORIENT HOLDINGS LTD. 1 
18 DAIDO CONCRETE (H.K.) LTD. 5 
19 CAPETRONIC INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
20 RIVERA (HOLDINGS) LTD. 3 
21 ZHENHAI REFINING & CHEMICAL CO., LTD. - H SHARES 5 
22 YIZHENG CHEMICAL FIBRE CO., LTD. - H SHARES 5 
23 PRESTIGE PROPERTIES HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
24 FAR EAST HOLDINGS INTERNATIONAL LTD. 4 
25 GOLDTRON HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
26 NANJING PANDA ELECTRONICS CO L TD - H SHARES 5 
27 WING ON INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
28 YAOHAN INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
29 SINCERE CO., LTD., THE 4 
30 LUOYANG GLASS CO., LTD. - H SHARES 5 
31 SOUTH SEA DEVELOPMENT CO., LTD. 3 
32 CHUANG'S CONSORTIUM INTERNATIONAL LTD. 4 
33 CONTINENTAL HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
34 EMPEROR (CHINA CONCEPT) INVESTMENTS LTD. 3 
35 CITY CHIU CHOW (HOLDINGS) LTD. 4 
36 MMNSHAN IRON & STEEL CO., LTD. - H SHARES 5 
37 CENTURY CITY INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
38 EMPEROR INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
39 GUANGZHOU SHIPYARD INT'L CO., LTD. - H SHARES 5 
40 ORIENT TELECOM & TECHNOLOGY HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
41 LlPPO LTD. 4 
42 NORTHEAST ELECTRICAL T& T MCHNY MFG CO L TD-H SHARES 5 
43 BEIREN PRINTING MACHINERY HOLDINGS L TD.- H SHARES 5 
44 HARBIN POWER EQUIPMENT CO., LTD. - H SHARES 5 
45 TIAN TECK LAND LTD. 6 
46 WINSOR INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION LTD. 5 
47 JILlN CHEMICAL INDUSTRIAL CO. LTD. - H SHARES 5 
48 LAI SUN GARMENT (INTERNATIONAL) LTD. 5 
49 CHENGDU TELECOM. CABLE CO., LTD. - H SHARES 5 
50 PAUL Y. PROPERTIES GROUP L TD 4 
51 KUNMING MACHINE TOOL CO., LTD. - H SHARES 5 
52 FAR EAST CONSORTIUM INTERNATIONAL LTD. 3 
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B/M Portfolios Formed in 1997 (Con't) 
No. Company Name Industry Code 
Glamour Stocks 
1 SHENYIN WANGUO (H.K.) LTD. 1 
2 YOSHIYA INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, LTD. 3 
3 PACIFIC PLYWOOD HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
4 WINSOR PROPERTIES HOLDINGS L TO 3 
5 COSCO PACIFIC LTD. 4 
6 CABLE AND WIRELESS PLC 2 
7 VTECH HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
8 TINGYI (CAYMAN ISLANDS) HOLDINGS CO RP 5 
9 HSBC HOLDINGS PLC 1 
10 CHINA ELEGANCE INTERNATINAL FASHION L TO 4 
11 C. P. POKPHAND CO., LTD. 4 
12 JARDINE INTERNATIONAL MOTOR HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
13 GLORIOUS SUN ENTERPRISES L TO 4 
14 CHUNG HWA DEVELOPMENT HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
15 ASIA SATELLITE TELECOMMUNICATIONS HOLDINGS LTD 4 
16 JET AIR INTERNATIONAL GROUP LTD 4 
17 PERFECT TREASURE HOLDINGS L TO 4 
18 TELEVISION BROADCASTS LTD. 4 
19 MOULlN INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
20 FIRST SIGN INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
21 WAH KWONG SHIPPING HOLDINGS LTD. 7 
22 GUOCO GROUP LTD. 1 
23 PEARL ORIENTAL HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
24 NATIONAL MUTUAL ASIA LTD. 1 
25 KWOON CHUNG BUS HOLDINGS L TO 4 
26 DAH HWA INTERNATIONAL (HOLDINGS) LTD. 4 
27 HONG KONG TELECOMMUNICATIONS LTD. 2 
28 WANON INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
29 THAI-ASIA FUND LTD., THE 1 
30 SOLARTECH INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS L TO 5 
31 TAl FOOK SECURITIES GROUP LTD 1 
32 DONG-JUN (HOLDINGS) LTD. 3 
33 JF INDONESIA FUND INC. 1 
34 SEAPOWER INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
35 NGAI L1K INDUSTRIAL HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
36 CNPC (HONG KONG) LTD. 7 
37 HSBC CHINA FUND LTD., THE 1 
38 FOUR SEAS MERCANTILE HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
39 MEI AH ENTERTAINMENT GROUP LTD. 4 
40 NG FUNG HONG LTD. 4 
41 CIL HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
42 CHINA MERCHANTS CHINA DIRECT INVESTMENTS LTD. 1 
43 TEXWINCA HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
44 GOLDLlON HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
45 THEME INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
46 LI & FUNG LTD. 4 
47 MIRABELL INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS L TO 4 
48 LEADING SPIRIT (HOLDINGS) CO., LTD. 4 
49 SHENZHEN INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
50 SHANGHAI INDUSTRIAL HOLDINGS L TO 5 
51 DENWAY INVESTMENT LTD. 5 
52 SIME DARBY HONG KONG LTD. 4 
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A.2 Company Name and Industry Code of Value and Glamour Stocks 
Classified by E/P Ratio from 1986 to 1997 
E/P Portfolios Formed in Year 1986 
No. Company Name Industry Code 
Value Stocks 
1 CHOW SANG SANG HOLDINGS INTERNATIONAL LTD. 4 
2 WINSOR INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION LTD. 5 
3 CHINA EVERBRIGHT INTERNATIONAL LTD. 4 
4 SOUTH SEA DEVELOPMENT CO., LTD. 3 
5 PRESTIGE PROPERTIES HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
6 CAPITAL ASIA LTD. 4 
7 FUJIAN GROUP LTD 3 
8 ENGLONG INTERNATIONAL LTD. 3 
9 B+B ASIA LTD. 5 
10 SHELL ELECTRIC MFG. (HOLDINGS) CO., LTD. 5 
11 ISLAND DYEING AND PRINTING CO., LTD. 3 
12 CNPC (HONG KONG) LTD. 7 
13 WAH KWONG SHIPPING HOLDINGS LTD. 7 
14 HOPEWELL HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
Glamour Stocks 
1 TSIM SHA TSUI PROPERTIES LTD. 3 
2 DICKSON CONCEPTS (INTERNATIONAL) LTD. 4 
3 DC FINANCE (HOLDINGS) LTD. 3 
4 HONG FOK CORPORATION LTD. 4 
5 HON KWOK LAND INVESTMENT CO., LTD. 3 
6 SEA HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
7 GREAT CHINA HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
8 UNION BANK OF HONG KONG LTD. 1 
9 CHINA RESOURCES ENTERPRISE, LTD. 3 
10 INDUSTRIAL EQUITY (PACFIC) LTD. 4 
11 JARDINE MATHESON HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
12 MIN XIN HOLDINGS LTD. 1 
13 SUN HUNG KAI & CO., LTD. 1 
14 PIONEER INDUSTRIES INTERNATIONAL (HOLDINGS) LTD. 4 
. •• • 
E/P Portfolios Formed in Year 1987 
No. Company Name 
Value Stocks 
Industry Code 
1 CHOW SANG SANG HOLDINGS INTERNATIONAL LTD. 4 
2 BEAUFORTE INVESTORS CORPORATION LTD. 1 
3 ASIA STANDARD INTERNATIONAL GROUP LTD. 3 
4 PEREGRINE INVESTMENTS HOLDINGS LTD. 1 
5 RAYMOND INDUSTRIAL LTD. 5 
6 DYNAMIC HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
7 CNPC (HONG KONG) LTD. 7 
8 PIONEER INDUSTRIES INTERNATIONAL (HOLDINGS) LTD. 4 
9 GUOCO LAND LTD 3 
10 WINFAIR INVESTMENT CO., LTD. 3 
11 TIAN TECK LAND LTD. 6 
12 FUJIAN GROUP LTD 3 
13 ENGLONG INTERNATIONAL LTD. 3 
14 LEI SHING HONG LTD. 4 
Glamour Stocks 
1 FIRST PACIFIC BANCSHARES HOLDINGS LTD. 2 
2 HON KWOK LAND INVESTMENT CO., LTD. 3 
3 DC FINANCE (HOLDINGS) LTD. 3 
4 DAN FORM HOLDINGS CO L TO 3 
5 ORIENT TELECOM & TECHNOLOGY HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
6 MELBOURNE ENTERPRISES LTD. 3 
7 TAl SANG LAND DEVELOPMENT LTD. 3 
8 MILLENNIUM GROUP LTD. 4 
9 TERN PROPERTIES CO., LTD. 3 
10 JARDINE MATHESON HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
11 POKFULAM DEVELOPMENT CO., LTD. 3 
12 HONG KONG FORTUNE LTD. 1 
13 WAH HA REALTY CO., LTD. 3 
14 CHINA ENTERTAINMENT & LAND INVESTMENTS HLDGS LTD. 3 
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E/P Portfolios Formed in Year 1988 
No. Company Name 
Value Stocks 
Industry Code 
1 CITIC PACIFIC LTD. 4 
2 MILLENNIUM GROUP LTD. 4 
3 CHINA UNITED HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
4 KONG TAl INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS CO., LTD. 3 
5 LEI SHING HONG LTD. 4 
6 WAH HA REALTY CO., LTD. 3 
7 PIONEER INDUSTRIES INTERNATIONAL (HOLDINGS) LTD. 4 
8 KECK SENG INVESTMENTS (HONG KONG) LTD. 3 
9 PALlBURG INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
10 APPLIED INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
11 FUJIAN GROUP L TO 3 
12 ENGLONG INTERNATIONAL LTD. 3 
13 CNPC (HONG KONG) LTD. 7 
14 ASIA STANDARD INTERNATIONAL GROUP LTD. 3 
15 CHINESE ESTATES HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
16 PRESTIGE PROPERTIES HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
17 CONTINENTAL MARINER INVESTMENT CO., LTD. 7 
18 COSMOPOLITAN INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
19 LION ASIA LTD. 3 
Glamour Stocks 
1 FIRST PACIFIC BANCSHARES HOLDINGS LTD. 2 
2 LlPPO CHINA RESOURCES L TO 3 
3 DAN FORM HOLDINGS CO L TO 3 
4 LAI SUN HOTELS INT'L LTD. 6 
5 HERALD HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
6 TERN PROPERTIES CO., LTD. 3 
7 SAFETY GODOWN CO., LTD. 4 
8 CABLE AND WIRELESS PLC 2 
9 CITIC KA WAH BANK L TO 1 
10 ASIA ORIENT HOLDINGS LTD. 1 
11 EMPEROR (CHINA CONCEPT) INVESTMENTS LTD. 3 
12 SHUN HO CONSTRUCTION (HOLDINGS) LTD. 3 
13 WINFOONG INTERNATIONAL LTD. 3 
14 FAI INSURANCES LTD. 1 
15 UNITED OVERSEAS BANK LTD. 1 
16 SOUTH CHINA STRATEGIC INVESTMENT L TO 4 
17 HAW PAR CORPORATION LTD. 4 
18 LAFE' INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
19 FAR EAST HOLDINGS INTERNATIONAL LTD. 4 
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E/P Portfolios Formed in Year 1989 
No. Company Name 
Value Stocks 
Industry Code 
1 CONTINENTAL MARINER INVESTMENT CO., LTD. 7 
2 WINSOR INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION LTD. 5 
3 ALLIED PROPERTIES (HK) LTD. 3 
4 SOUTH SEA DEVELOPMENT CO., LTD. 3 
5 LAWS INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
6 B+B ASIA LTD. 5 
7 ELEC & EL TEK INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
8 CHUANG'S CONSORTIUM INTERNATIONAL LTD. 4 
9 CHINA UNITED HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
10 MILLENNIUM GROUP LTD. 4 
11 ASEAN RESOURCES HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
12 YANGTZEKIANG GARMENT MANUFACTURING CO., LTD. 5 
13 HENG FUNG HOLDINGS CO., LTD. 3 
14 STELUX HOLDINGS INT'L LTD. 4 
15 TSIM SHA TSUI PROPERTIES LTD. 3 
16 CITIC PACIFIC LTD. 4 
17 OCEAN-LAND GROUP LTD 4 
18 WAH HA REALTY CO., LTD. 3 
19 TVE (HOLDINGS) LTD. 4 
20 SHUN HO CONSTRUCTION (HOLDINGS) LTD. 3 
21 TOP GLORY INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
Glamour Stocks 
1 MELCO INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT LTD. 4 
2 POLY INVESTMENTS HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
3 CHINA RESOURCES ENTERPRISE, LTD. 3 
4 ASIA ORIENT HOLDINGS LTD. 1 
5 CABLE AND WIRELESS PLC 2 
6 SOUTH CHINA HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
7 TOMEI INTERNATIONAL (HOLDINGS) LTD. 5 
8 WINFOONG INTERNATIONAL LTD. 3 
9 HERALD HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
10 EMPEROR (CHINA CONCEPT) INVESTMENTS LTD. 3 
11 LlPPO CHINA RESOURCES L TO 3 
12 RIVERA (HOLDINGS) LTD. 3 
13 CHINA & EASTERN INVESTMENT CO., LTD. 1 
14 TRISTATE HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
15 TERN PROPERTIES CO., LTD. 3 
16 HONG KONG DAILY NEWS HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
17 TIAN AN CHINA INVESTMENTS CO., LTD. 3 
18 UNION BANK OF HONG KONG LTD. 1 
19 HAW PAR CORPORATION LTD. 4 
20 UNITED OVERSEAS BANK LTD. 1 
21 FAIRYOUNG HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
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E/P Portfolios Formed in Year 1990 
No. Company Name 
Value Stocks 
Industry Code 
1 CHEVALIER INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
2 WONG'S INTERNATIONAL (HOLDINGS) LTD. 5 
3 BURWILL HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
4 YANGTZEKIANG GARMENT MANUFACTURING CO., LTD. 5 
5 PEREGRINE INVESTMENTS HOLDINGS LTD. 1 
6 EMPEROR INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
7 FUJIAN GROUP L TD 3 
8 TAl CHEUNG HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
9 NANYANG HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
10 WONG'S KONG KING INTERNATIONAL (HOLDINGS) LTD. 4 
11 BEST WIDE GROUP LTD. 5 
12 LEE HING DEVELOPMENT LTD. 3 
13 CHINA INVESTMENTS HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
14 WAH HA REALTY CO., LTD. 3 
15 HENDERSON INVESTMENT LTD. 3 
16 MILLENNIUM GROUP LTD. 4 
17 CHINA AEROSPACE INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
18 YGM TRADING LTD. 4 
19 QPL INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
20 LUKS INDUSTRIAL CO., LTD. 5 
21 TOP GLORY INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
22 GRAND HOTEL HOLDINGS LTD. 'A' 6 
23 TVE (HOLDINGS) LTD. 4 
24 REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION LTD. 'A' 3 
Glamour Stocks 
1 FAIRYOUNG HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
2 SEN HONG RESURCES HOLDINGS L TD 7 
3 CABLE AND WIRELESS PLC 2 
4 EMPEROR (CHINA CONCEPT) INVESTMENTS LTD. 3 
5 HONG KONG DAILY NEWS HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
6 MELCO INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT LTD. 4 
7 SHENZHEN INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
8 ASIA ORIENT HOLDINGS LTD. 1 
9 TERN PROPERTIES CO., LTD. 3 
10 FAIINSURANCES LTD. 1 
11 MAGNIFICENT ESTATES LTD. 3 
12 HAW PAR CORPORATION LTD. 4 
13 BURLlNGAME INTERNATIONAL CO., LTD. 3 
14 SEAPOWER RESOURCES INTERNATIONAL LTD. 4 
15 GOLDTRON HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
16 ASM PACIFIC TECHNOLOGY LTD. 5 
17 FIRST PACIFIC CO., LTD. 4 
18 UNITED OVERSEAS BANK LTD. 1 
19 WAH KWONG SHIPPING HOLDINGS LTD. 7 
20 DAIDO CONCRETE (H.K.) LTD. 5 
21 FAR EAST HOTELS & ENTERTAINMENT LTD. 6 
22 L1PPO CHINA RESOURCES L TD 3 
23 SINCERE CO., LTD., THE 4 
24 CHINA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION LTD 4 
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E/P Portfolios Formed in Year 1991 
No. Company Name 
Value Stocks 
Industry Code 
1 TSIM SHA TSUI PROPERTIES LTD. 3 
2 ALLIED PROPERTIES (HK) LTD. 3 
3 ENGLONG INTERNATIONAL LTD. 3 
4 SAFETY GODOWN CO., LTD. 4 
5 WONG'S INTERNATIONAL (HOLDINGS) LTD. 5 
6 SWIRE PACIFIC LTD. 'A' 4 
7 DAN FORM HOLDINGS CO L TO 3 
8 WONG'S KONG KING INTERNATIONAL (HOLDINGS) LTD. 4 
9 CHOW SANG SANG HOLDINGS INTERNATIONAL LTD. 4 
10 KECK SENG INVESTMENTS (HONG KONG) LTD. 3 
11 LAI SUN DEVELOPMENT CO., LTD. 3 
12 WINFOONG INTERNATIONAL LTD. 3 
13 JARDINE INTERNATIONAL MOTOR HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
14 LANE CRAWFORD INTERNATIONAL LTD. 'A' 4 
15 SOUTH SEA DEVELOPMENT CO., LTD. 3 
16 RAYMOND INDUSTRIAL LTD. 5 
17 GOODWILL INVESTMENT (HOLDINGS) LTD. 1 
18 LEE HING DEVELOPMENT LTD. 3 
19 CONTINENTAL MARINER INVESTMENT CO., LTD. 7 
20 GREAT EAGLE HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
21 YGM TRADING LTD. 4 
22 HUEY TAl INTERNATIONAL LTD. 3 
23 SHUN HO RESOURCES HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
Glamour Stocks 
1 ASEAN RESOURCES HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
2 JF INDONESIA FUND INC. 1 
3 HONG KONG PARKVIEW GROUP LTD. 3 
4 COL HOTELS INTERNATIONAL LTD. 6 
5 THAI-ASIA FUND LTD., THE 1 
6 CHINA EVERBRIGHT INTERNATIONAL LTD. 4 
7 CHINA EVERBRIGHT L TO 4 
8 CHINA RESOURCES ENTERPRISE, LTD. 3 
9 CHINA & EASTERN INVESTMENT CO., LTD. 1 
10 CABLE AND WIRELESS PLC 2 
11 SEN HONG RESURCES HOLDINGS L TO 7 
12 SOUTH CHINA HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
13 TIAN AN CHINA INVESTMENTS CO., LTD. 3 
14 SHENZHEN INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
15 LlPPO CHINA RESOURCES L TO 3 
16 C. P. POKPHAND CO., LTD. 4 
17 HAW PAR CORPORATION LTD. 4 
18 ORIENT TELECOM & TECHNOLOGY HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
19 HONGKONG LAND HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
20 MELCO INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT LTD. 4 
21 FAR EAST HOTELS & ENTERTAINMENT LTD. 6 
22 CNPC (HONG KONG) LTD. 7 
23 SHOUGANG CONCORD TECHNOLOGY HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
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E/P Portfolios Formed in Year 1992 
No. Company Name Industry Code 
Value Stocks 
1 YANGTZEKIANG GARMENT MANUFACTURING CO., LTD. 5 
2 FU HUl HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
3 KECK SENG INVESTMENTS (HONG KONG) LTD. 3 
4 LAI SUN GARMENT (INTERNATIONAL) LTD. 5 
5 WONG'S KONG KING INTERNATIONAL (HOLDINGS) LTD. 4 
6 LEE HING DEVELOPMENT LTD. 3 
7 WAH HA REALTY CO., LTD. 3 
8 LION ASIA LTD. 3 
9 FOUNTAIN SET (HOLDINGS) LTD. 5 
10 ASIA STANDARD INTERNATIONAL GROUP LTD. 3 
11 LANE CRAWFORD INTERNATIONAL LTD. TV 4 
12 CONTINENTAL HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
13 ENGLONG INTERNATIONAL LTD. 3 
14 HONG KONG TOY CENTRE INTERNATIONAL LTD. 5 
15 ALLIED PROPERTIES (HK) LTD. 3 
16 LAI SUN DEVELOPMENT CO., LTD. 3 
17 TRISTATE HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
18 CHOW SANG SANG HOLDINGS INTERNATIONAL LTD. 4 
19 CHINA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION LTD 4 
20 CENTURY CITY INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
21 FAR EAST CONSORTIUM INTERNATIONAL LTD. 3 
22 CONTINENTAL MARINER INVESTMENT CO., LTD. 7 
23 CHUANG'S CONSORTIUM INTERNATIONAL LTD. 4 
24 CROCODILE GARMENTS LTD. 4 
25 CAPITAL ASIA LTD. 4 
26 PRESTIGE PROPERTIES HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
Glamour Stocks 
1 JF INDONESIA FUND INC. 1 
2 BURLINGAME INTERNATIONAL CO., LTD. 3 
3 ELEC & ELTEK INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
4 MAGNIFICENT ESTATES LTD. 3 
5 HONG KONG FORTUNE LTD. 1 
6 CABLE AND WIRELESS PLC 2 
7 MANSION HOUSE GROUP LTD. "1 
8 SHUN HO CONSTRUCTION (HOLDINGS) LTD. 3 
9 UPPO LTD. 4 
10 TYSAN HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
11 CHINA EVERBRIGHT INTERNATIONAL LTD. 4 
12 GUANGDONG INVESTMENT LTD. 4 
13 FAR EAST HOLDINGS INTERNATIONAL LTD. 4 
14 C. P. POKPHAND CO., LTD. 4 
15 KONG TAI INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS CO., LTD. 3 
16 GUOCO GROUP LTD. 1 
17 JARDINE INTERNATIONAL MOTOR HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
18 CHINA STRATEGIC HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
19 TIAN AN CHINA INVESTMENTS CO., LTD. 3 
20 UNITED OVERSEAS BANK LTD. 1 
21 ORIENT TELECOM & TECHNOLOGY HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
22 YU MING INVESTMENTS LTD 1 
23 HAW PAR CORPORATION LTD. 4 
24 CITIC PACIFIC LTD. ^ 
25 TSE SUI LUEN JEWELLERY (INTERNATIONAL) LTD. 4 
26 WAH KWONG SHIPPING HOLDINGS LTD. 7 
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B/M Portfolios Formed in 1992 (Con't) 
No. Company Name Industry Code 
Value Stocks 
1 OCEAN INFORMATION HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
2 YGM TRADING LTD. 4 
3 ALLIED PROPERTIES (HK) LTD. 3 
4 SEMI-TECH (GLOBAL) CO., LTD. 5 
5 LAI SUN DEVELOPMENT CO., LTD. 3 
6 CHINA EVERBRIGHT TECHNOLOGY LTD. 5 
7 HONG KONG BUILDING AND LOAN AGENCY LTD. 1 
8 CAPITAL AUTOMATION HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
9 TYSAN HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
10 ITC CORPORATION LTD 5 
11 HING KONG HOLDINGS LTD 5 
12 ALLIED GROUP LTD. 4 
13 TRISTATE HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
14 REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION LTD. TV 3 
15 TERMBRAY INDUSTRIES INTERNATIONAL (HOLDINGS) LTD. 5 
16 EMPEROR INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
17 RIVERA (HOLDINGS) LTD. 3 
18 CHEVAUER DEVELOPMENT INTERNATIONAL LTD. 3 
19 FAR EAST CONSORTIUM INTERNATIONAL LTD. 3 
20 JOYCE BOUTIQUE HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
21 TAK WING INVESTMENT (HOLDINGS) LTD. 3 
22 CONTINENTAL MARINER INVESTMENT CO., LTD. 7 
23 OCEAN-LAND GROUP LTD 4 
24 HARBOUR RING INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
25 KONG TAI INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS CO., LTD. 3 
26 WAH HA REALTY CO., LTD. 3 
27 YANION INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
28 SUN MAN TAI HLODINGS CO LTD 5 
29 GOLDTRON HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
30 HUEY TAI INTERNATIONAL LTD. 3 
31 DAN FORM HOLDINGS CO LTD 3 
32 PRESTIGE PROPERTIES HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
33 K. WAH INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
34 HOPEWELL HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
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E/P Portfolios Formed in Year 1993 (Con't) 
No. Company Name Industry Code 
Glamour Stocks 
1 BANK OF EAST ASIA LTD. 1 
2 UNIVERSAL APPLIANCES LTD. 5 
3 RJP ELECTRONICS LTD. 5 
4 ORIENT POWER HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
5 PAUL Y. PROPERTIES GROUP L TO 4 
6 CHINA ASSETS (HOLDINGS) LTD. 1 
7 JF INDONESIA FUND INC. 1 
8 PENINSULAR AND ORIENTAL STEAM NAVIGATION CO. 4 
9 GUANGDONG INVESTMENT LTD. 4 
10 ORIENT TELECOM & TECHNOLOGY HOLDINGS L TO. 4 
11 C. P. POKPHAND CO., LTD. 4 
12 L1PPO LTD. 4 
13 HSBC HOLDINGS PLC 1 
14 ALLAN INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
15 ORIENT OVERSEAS (INTERNATIONAL) LTD. 4 
16 JAROINE INTERNATIONAL MOTOR HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
17 ASEAN RESOURCES HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
18 WINFOONG INTERNATIONAL LTD. 3 
19 DC FINANCE (HOLDINGS) LTD. 3 
20 MIRAMAR HOTEL & INVESTMENT CO., LTD. 6 
21 HONG KONG FORTUNE LTD. 1 
22 HAW PAR CORPORATION LTD. 4 
23 HUNG HING PRINTING GROUP LTD. 5 
24 TIAN AN CHINA INVESTMENTS CO., LTD. 3 
25 BURLlNGAME INTERNATIONAL CO., LTD. 3 
26 FAIRYOUNG HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
27 BUILDMORE INTERNATIONAL LTD. 3 
28 APPLIED INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
29 LAM SOON (HONG KONG) LTD. 5 
30 HONG KONG PARKVIEW GROUP LTD. 3 
31 CHEVALIER (OA) INTERNATIONAL LTD. 4 
32 GUOCO GROUP LTD. 1 
33 ASIA STANDARD INTERNATIONAL GROUP LTD. 3 
34 CHI CHEUNG INVESTMENT CO., LTD. 3 
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E/P Portfolios Formed in Year 1994 
No. Company Name 
Value Stocks 
Industry Code 
1 TUNG FONG HUNG (HOLDINGS) LTD. 4 
2 CYBERSONIC TECHNOLOGY L TO 5 
3 REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION LTD. 3 
4 MAGNUM INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
5 TAK WING INVESTMENT (HOLDINGS) LTD. 3 
6 RECOR HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
7 GOLDEN POWER INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
8 KECK SENG INVESTMENTS (HONG KONG) LTD. 3 
9 MILLENNIUM GROUP LTD. 4 
10 SHUN CHEONG HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
11 CHUNG TAl PRINTING HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
12 WAH HA REALTY CO., LTD. 3 
13 ENGLONG INTERNATIONAL LTD. 3 
14 COSCO INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS L TD 5 
15 CAPITAL AUTOMATION HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
16 TOMEI INTERNATIONAL (HOLDINGS) LTD. 5 
17 ASIA ORIENT HOLDINGS LTD. 1 
18 CHINNEY ALLIANCE GROUP L TO 4 
19 PAK FAH YEOW INTERNATIONAL LTD. 5 
20 PAUL Y. PROPERTIES GROUP L TD 4 
21 L1PPO CHINA RESOURCES L TD 3 
22 CENTRAL CHINA ENTERPRISES L TO 5 
23 YGM TRADING LTD. 4 
24 SEMI-TECH (GLOBAL) CO. , LTD. 5 
25 CHEVALIER DEVELOPMENT INTERNATIONAL LTD. 3 
26 FUNG CHEUNG KEE HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
27 WONG'S KONG KING INTERNATIONAL (HOLDINGS) LTD. 4 
28 TACK HSIN HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
29 CHI CHEUNG INVESTMENT CO., LTD. 3 
30 PEACE MARK (HOLDINGS) LTD. 5 
31 HING KONG HOLDINGS L TD 5 
32 ORIENT POWER HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
33 KWONG SANG HONG INTERNATIONAL LTD. 3 
34 LION ASIA LTD. 3 
35 CHUANG'S CONSORTIUM INTERNATIONAL LTD. 4 
36 SAFETY GODOWN CO., LTD. 4 
37 YOSHIYA INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, LTD. 3 
38 SINCERE CO., LTD., THE 4 
39 MANDARIN RESOURCES CORPORATION LTD. 4 
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E/P Portfolios Formed in Year 1994 (Con't) 
No. Company Name Industry Code 
Glamour Stocks 
1 DEZHONG ENTERPRISES INVESTMENTS LTD. 1 
2 JF INDONESIA FUND INC. 1 
3 HSBC CHINA FUND LTD., THE 1 
4 CHINA FOODS HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
5 ORIENT OVERSEAS (INTERNATIONAL) LTD. 4 
6 CHINA UNITED HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
7 TYSAN HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
8 WING SHAN INTERNATIONAL LTD. 2 
9 VTECH HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
10 DC FINANCE (HOLDINGS) LTD. 3 
11 CHINA INVESTMENTS HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
12 FIRST SHANGHAI INVESTMENTS LTD. 1 
13 CABLE AND WIRELESS PLC 2 
14 PLOTIO HOLDINGS L TO 3 
15 MIRAMAR HOTEL & INVESTMENT CO., LTD. 6 
16 PENINSULAR AND ORIENTAL STEAM NAVIGATION CO. 4 
17 CONTINENTAL MARINER INVESTMENT CO., LTD. 7 
18 C. P. POKPHAND CO., LTD. 4 
19 HSBC HOLDINGS PLC 1 
20 BUILDMORE INTERNATIONAL LTD. 3 
21 PARAMOUNT PUBLISHING GROUP LTD. 5 
22 FAIRYOUNG HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
23 FIRST PACIFIC CO., LTD. 4 
24 MELCO INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT LTD. 4 
25 HONG KONG FORTUNE LTD. 1 
26 UNIVERSAL APPLIANCES LTD. 5 
27 ITC CORPORATION L TO 5 
28 JARDINE INTERNATIONAL MOTOR HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
29 MUI HONG KONG LTD. 4 
30 LEI SHING HONG LTD. 4 
31 HAW PAR CORPORATION LTD. 4 
32 GOODWILL INVESTMENT (HOLDINGS) LTD. 1 
33 BERJAYA HOLDINGS (HK) LTD. 3 
34 GUANGZHOU INVESTMENT CO., LTD. 3 
35 TSINGTAO BREWERY CO., LTD. - H SHARES 5 
36 G-PROP (HOLDINGS) L TO 5 
37 KONG TAl INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS CO., LTD. 3 
38 CONTINENTAL HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
39 SINO FOUNDATIONS HOLDINGS L TO 5 
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E/P Portfolios Formed in Year 1995 
No. Company Name 
Value Stocks 
1 CENTURY CITY INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 
2 LE SAUNDA HOLDINGS LTD. 
3 FORTEI HOLDINGS LTD. 
4 DAIWAASSOCIATE HOLDINGS LTD. 
5 FAR EAST HOLDINGS INTERNATIONAL LTD. 
6 LAI SUN GARMENT (INTERNATIONAL) LTD. 
7 LlNKFUL INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS L TD 
8 FORTUNA INT'L HOLDINGS L TD 
9 LEE HING DEVELOPMENT LTD. 
10 LANE CRAWFORD INTERNATIONAL LTD. 'A' 
11 FRANKIE DOMINION INTERNATIONAL LTD. 
12 TOMEI INTERNATIONAL (HOLDINGS) LTD. 
13 KOSONIC INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 
14 HON KWOK LAND INVESTMENT CO., LTD. 
15 CHINNEY ALLIANCE GROUP L TD 
16 G-PROP (HOLDINGS) L TD 
17 LUOYANG GLASS CO., LTD. - H SHARES 
18 PAUL Y. PROPERTIES GROUP L TD 
19 ENGLONG INTERNATIONAL LTD. 
20 QUALITY HEAL THCARE ASIA LTD. 
21 KADER HOLDINGS CO., LTD. 
22 PRESTIGE PROPERTIES HOLDINGS LTD. 
23 SOUTH CHINA BROKERAGE CO., LTD. 
24 KUNMING MACHINE TOOL CO., LTD. - H SHARES 
25 NORITY INTERNATIONAL GROUP LTD. 
26 CHINNEY INVESTMENTS, LTD. 
27 EMPEROR (CHINA CONCEPT) INVESTMENTS LTD. 
28 ANKOR GROUP LTD. 
29 SOUTH CHINA HOLDINGS LTD. 
30 OCEAN-LAND GROUP L TD 
31 NATIONAL ELECTRONICS HOLDINGS LTD. 
32 CHEUNG TAl HONG HOLDINGS LTD. 
33 SEMI-TECH (GLOBAL) CO., LTD. 
34 HUEY TAl INTERNATIONAL LTD. 
35 HERALD HOLDINGS LTD. 
36 RECOR HOLDINGS LTD. 
37 LEEFUNG-ASCO PRINTERS HOLDINGS LTD. 
38 HKR INTERNATIONAL LTD. 
39 RIVERA (HOLDINGS) LTD. 
40 POLY INVESTMENTS HOLDINGS LTD. 
41 EMPEROR INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 
42 MANDARIN RESOURCES CORPORATION LTD. 
43 MINGLY CORPORATION LTD., THE 















































E/P Portfolios Formed in Year 1995 (Con't) 
No, Company Name Industry Code 
Glamour Stocks 
1 SHANGHAI INTL SHANGHAI GROWTH INVESTMENT LTD. 1 
2 FAI INSURANCES LTD. 1 
3 JF INDONESIA FUND INC. 1 
4 ORIENT POWER HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
5 SUWA INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
6 NATIONAL MUTUAL ASIA LTD. 1 
7 THAI ASSET FUND LTD., THE - PART. PREFERENCE SHRS 1 
8 RJP ELECTRONICS LTD. 5 
9 CHINA MERCHANTS CHINA DIRECT INVESTMENTS LTD. 1 
10 FAR EAST HOTELS & ENTERTAINMENT LTD. 6 
11 FUJIAN GROUP LTD 3 
12 BUILDMORE INTERNATIONAL LTD. 3 
13 VTECH HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
14 CIL HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
15 MIRAMAR HOTEL & INVESTMENT CO., LTD. 6 
16 HSBC CHINA FUND LTD., THE 1 
17 MUl HONG KONG LTD. 4 
18 FAR EAST ALUMINIUM (HOLDINGS) LTD. 5 
19 FIRST PACIFIC CO.. LTD. 4 
20 PENINSULAR AND ORIENTAL STEAM NAVIGATION CO. 4 
21 STYLAND HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
22 C. P. POKPHAND CO., LTD. 4 
23 CHINA ASSETS (HOLDINGS) LTD. 1 
24 HSBC HOLDINGS PLC 1 
25 GUOCO GROUP LTD. 1 
26 HAW PAR CORPORATION LTD. 4 
27 SAN MIGUEL BREWERY HONG KONG LTD. 5 
28 POKFULAM DEVELOPMENT CO., LTD. 3 
29 WAH KWONG SHIPPING HOLDINGS LTD. 7 
30 SHENZHEN INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
31 COSCO PACIFIC LTD. 4 
32 ORIENT TELECOM & TECHNOLOGY HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
33 JARDINE INTERNATIONAL MOTOR HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
34 YAU LEE HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
35 SHOUGANG CONCORD INTL ENTERPRISES CO., LTD. 4 
36 CHINA MERCHANTS HOLDINGS (INTERNATIONAL) CO LTD 5 
37 PLOTIO HOLDINGS LTD 3 
38 SINGAPORE HONG KONG PROPERTIES INVESTMENT LTD. 4 
39 DEZHONG ENTERPRISES INVESTMENTS LTD. 1 
40 LION ASIA LTD. 3 
41 YANGTZEKIANG GARMENT MANUFACTURING CO., LTD. 5 
42 CHINA AEROSPACE INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
43 LEI SHING HONG LTD. 4 
44 MILLENNIUM GROUP LTD. 4 
113 
E/P Portfolios Formed in Year 1996 
No. Company Name 
Value Stocks 
Industry Code 
1 DYNAMIC HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
2 LAI SUN GARMENT (INTERNATIONAL) LTD. 5 
3 CENTURY CITY INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
4 PUDONG DEVELOPMENT HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
5 HUEY TAl INTERNATIONAL LTD. 3 
6 CUL TURECOM HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
7 MATRIX HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
8 CHEUNG WAH DEVELOPMENT CO., LTD. 5 
9 HONGKONG FROZEN FOOD HOLDINGS L TD 4 
10 YUGANG INTERNATIONAL LTD. 4 
11 DONG-JUN (HOLDINGS) LTD. 3 
12 LION ASIA LTD. 3 
13 PAUL Y. PROPERTIES GROUP L TD 4 
14 JILlN CHEMICAL INDUSTRIAL CO. LTD. - H SHARES 5 
15 FIRST SHANGHAI INVESTMENTS LTD. 1 
16 SHANGHAI PETROCHEMICAL CO., LTD. - H SHARES 5 
17 MAANSHAN IRON & STEEL CO., LTD. - H SHARES 5 
18 YIZHENG CHEMICAL FIBRE CO., LTD. - H SHARES 5 
19 KUNMING MACHINE TOOL CO., LTD. - H SHARES 5 
20 KOWLOON MOTOR BUS CO HOLDINGS L TD 2 
21 KUMAGAI GUM I (HONG KONG) LTD. 5 
22 FRONTEER INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS L TD 4 
23 SOUTH EAST GROUP LTD. 5 
24 LlPPO CHINA RESOURCES LTD 3 
25 ZHENHAI REFINING & CHEMICAL CO., LTD. - H SHARES 5 
26 SUN MAN TAl HLODINGS CO L TD 5 
27 RIVERA (HOLDINGS) LTD. 3 
28 CHUANG'S CONSORTIUM INTERNATIONAL LTD. 4 
29 LUOYANG GLASS CO., LTD. - H SHARES 5 
30 HONG KONG FORTUNE LTD. 1 
31 WING ON COMPANY INTERNATIONAL LTD. 4 
32 LlPPO LTD. 4 
33 GUANGZHOU SHIPYARD INT'L CO., LTD. - H SHARES 5 
34 WING ON INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
35 YU MING INVESTMENTS L TD 1 
36 CHINA SHIPPING DEVELOPMENT CO L TD - H SHARES 7 
37 BEIREN PRINTING MACHINERY HOLDINGS L TD.- H SHARES 5 
38 JINHUI HOLDINGS CO., LTD. 7 
39 LAM SOON FOOD INDUSTRIES LTD. 5 
40 EASY CONCEPTS INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS L TD 4 
41 SAN MIGUEL BREWERY HONG KONG LTD. 5 
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E/P Portfolios Formed in Year 1996 (Con't) 











































CHINA EVERBRIGHT INTERNATIONAL LTD. 
THAI ASSET FUND LTD. 
SHENYIN WANGUO (H.K.) LTD. 
COSCO PACIFIC LTD. 
POKFULAM DEVELOPMENT CO., LTD. 
MIRAMAR HOTEL & INVESTMENT CO., LTD. 
FIRST PACIFIC CO., LTD. 
SEAPOWER INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 
CHINA MERCHANTS CHINA DIRECT INVESTMENTS LTD. 
VTECH HOLDINGS LTD. 
C. P. POKPHANO CO., LTD. 
DC FINANCE (HOLDINGS) LTD. 
HSBC HOLDINGS PLC 
FU HUI HOLDINGS LTD. 
VINCENT INTERTRANS (HOLDINGS) LTD. 
PCL ENTERPRISES HOLDINGS LTD. 
GUOCO GROUP LTD. 
KING PACIFIC INT'L HOLDINGS L TO 
CENTRAL CHINA ENTERPRISES L TO 
FOUNDER (HONG KONG) LTD. 
JAROINE INTERNATIONAL MOTOR HOLDINGS LTD. 
HERALD HOLDINGS LTD. 
NGAI LlK INDUSTRIAL HOLDINGS LTD. 
OAH HWA INTERNATIONAL (HOLDINGS) LTD. 
ORIENT OVERSEAS (INTERNATIONAL) LTD. 
ROCKAPETTA HOLDINGS LTD. 
STELUX HOLDINGS INT'L LTD. 
RHINE HOLDINGS LTD. 
FAR EAST ALUMINIUM (HOLDINGS) LTD. 
NORITY INTERNATIONAL GROUP LTD. 
CHUNG HWA DEVELOPMENT HOLDINGS LTD. 
FUJIAN GROUP L TO 
SUWA INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 
LEI SHING HONG LTD. 
SAME TIME HOLDINGS LTD. 
BEST WIDE GROUP LTD. 
SHANGHAI INTL SHANGHAI GROWTH INVESTMENT LTD. 
CAPITAL ASIA LTD. 
FRANKIE DOMINION INTERNATIONAL LTD. 
WAH KWONG SHIPPING HOLDINGS LTD. 












































E/P Portfolios Formed in Year 1997 
No. Company Name 
Value Stocks 
Industry Code 
1 KANTONE HOLDINGS LTD 5 
2 REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION LTD. 3 
3 GILBERT HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
4 RBI HOLDINGS L TO 5 
5 CHINNEY INVESTMENTS, LTD. 5 
6 DAIWA ASSOCIATE HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
7 TRISTATE HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
8 HARBIN POWER EQUIPMENT CO., LTD. - H SHARES 5 
9 CLIMAX INTERNATIONAL CO., LTD. 5 
10 QPL INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
11 H B INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
12 HONKO INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS L TO 4 
13 DYNAMIC HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
14 CHEVALIER CONSTRUCTION HOLDINGS L TO 5 
15 PROCESS AUTOMATION (HOLDINGS) LTD. 5 
16 WING ON INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
17 AV CONCEPT HOLDINGS LTD 4 
18 RYODEN DEVELOPMENT LTD. 3 
19 YANION INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
20 HONG KONG TOY CENTRE INTERNATIONAL LTD. 5 
21 SHELL ELECTRIC MFG. (HOLDINGS) CO., LTD. 5 
22 CHINA APOLLO HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
23 VICTORY CITY INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS L TO 5 
24 NEW ASIA REALTY AND TRUST CO., LTD. 'A' 3 
25 ALCO HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
26 ZHENHAI REFINING & CHEMICAL CO., LTD. - H SHARES 5 
27 RHINE HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
28 GUANGZHOU SHIPYARD INTL CO., LTD. - H SHARES 5 
29 WINFAIR INVESTMENT CO., LTD. 3 
30 NANJING PANDA ELECTRONICS CO L TO - H SHARES 5 
31 KECK SENG INVESTMENTS (HONG KONG) LTD. 3 
32 FRANKIE DOMINION INTERNATIONAL LTD. 5 
33 LUOYANG GLASS CO., LTD. - H SHARES 5 
34 SHANGHAI PETROCHEMICAL CO., LTD. - H SHARES 5 
35 SOUTH CHINA INDUSTRIES LTD. 5 
36 CHINA RICH HOLDINGS L TO 5 
37 YIZHENG CHEMICAL FIBRE CO., LTD. - H SHARES 5 
38 NORTHEAST ELECTRICAL T&T MCHNY MFG CO L TO 5 
39 BEIREN PRINTING MACHINERY HOLDINGS L TO 5 
40 YU MING INVESTMENTS L TO 1 
41 SHAW BROTHERS (HONG KONG) LTD. 4 
42 JILlN CHEMICAL INDUSTRIAL CO. LTD. - H SHARES 5 
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E/P Portfolios Formed in Year 1997 (Con't) 
No. Company Name Industry Code 
Glamour Stocks 
1 LAI SUN HOTELS INT'L LTD. 6 
2 SINCERE CO., LTD., THE 4 
3 PACIFIC PLYWOOD HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
4 DONG-JUN (HOLDINGS) LTD. 3 
5 COSCO PACIFIC LTD. 4 
6 APT SATELLITE HOLDINGS LTD 4 
7 SHENZHEN INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
8 PAUL Y. PROPERTIES GROUP LTD 4 
9 CCT TELECOM HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
10 CHINA EVERBRIGHT L TO 4 
11 ORIENTAL PRESS GROUP LTD. 4 
12 CELESTIAL ASIA SECURITIES HOLDINGS L TO 1 
13 CABLE AND WIRELESS PLC 2 
14 MAGNUM INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
15 STARLlTE HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
16 MEI AH ENTERTAINMENT GROUP LTD. 4 
17 S. MEGGA INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
18 HONG KONG FORTUNE LTD. 1 
19 HWA KA Y THAI HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
20 MIRAMAR HOTEL & INVESTMENT CO., LTD. 6 
21 PRESTIGE PROPERTIES HOLDINGS LTD. 3 
22 SINGAMAS CONTAINER HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
23 HSBC HOLDINGS PLC 1 
24 TINGYI (CAYMAN ISLANDS) HOLDINGS CO RP 5 
25 FUJIAN GROUP L TO 3 
26 DC FINANCE (HOLDINGS) LTD. 3 
27 FORTUNA INT'L HOLDINGS L TO 5 
28 CHINA ASSETS (HOLDINGS) LTD. 1 
29 MANSION HOLDINGS LTD. 4 
30 C. P. POKPHAND CO., LTD. 4 
31 DAN FORM HOLDINGS CO L TO 3 
32 CHINA MERCHANTS CHINA DIRECT INVESTMENTS LTD. 1 
33 MIN XIN HOLDINGS LTD. 1 
34 CHINA RESOURCES ENTERPRISE, LTD. 3 
35 FIRST PACIFIC CO., LTD. 4 
36 VTECH HOLDINGS LTD. 5 
37 GUOCO GROUP LTD. 1 
38 RIGHTEOUS (HOLDINGS) LTD. 4 
39 NEW WORLD INFRASTRUCTURE LTD. 5 
40 SOUTH CHINA BROKERAGE CO., LTD. 1 
41 CITYBUS GROUP L TO 2 
42 MAANSHAN IRON & STEEL CO., LTD. - H SHARES 5 
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